State of relations between Russia and France

 

Question: How is Russia planning to develop relations in diplomacy with France’s new Foreign Minister Stephane Sejourne in the context of his first foreign visit to Kiev? Is it possible to talk about bilateral dialogue in the near future?

Answer: The building of any working relationship primarily depends on two factors: mutual interests of the given countries in such relations and whether their official authorities are ready to take specific steps to this end. In this context, it is clear that today relations between Russia and France are in deep crisis and not from Russia’s doing.

Paris occupies an openly hostile position as regards our country, and its officials regularly talk about the importance of inflicting a “strategic defeat on Russia.” Guided by this ideological concept, in the past two years our former partners themselves destroyed what had been created over decades. They froze the mechanisms of dialogue and support for cooperation and dealt a strong blow to trade, economic, scientific, cultural and humanitarian cooperation.

We have noted more than once that Russia has always remained open to dialogue with all foreign representatives from unfriendly countries, including France, on any issues of mutual interest. That said, the sad experience of the Minsk agreements which were guaranteed, among others, by Paris, graphically demonstrated the reluctance of the collective West to consider Russia’s vital national interests, in part, as regards the fundamental aspects of pan-European and global security.

Therefore, it would be more logical to address the question about the possibility of dialogue to France. Is it ready for an honest and unbiased discussion of the reasons for the processes taking place in Europe and the rest of the world? Does it want to look for a way out of the current situation based on mutual respect and consideration of the interests of all countries? The first statements by the new Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Stephane Sejournee, about the “existential battle” being waged by France and the rest of Europe in Ukraine, do not suggest an affirmative answer to these questions. Nor do we have any illusions about his ability or desire to “change the game” and act contrary to the EU and NATO instructions that are de facto coming from Washington.

In any event, we are ready to reply to any viable and constructive initiatives for settling the conflict in Ukraine with due account of the new political and legal realities and in the context of a discussion of other global and regional issues. Russia has never rejected an honest dialogue with any states. We are as adamant as ever on the main criteria – consideration of Russia’s vital interests, underwritten by guarantees, and the principles of mutual respect.

 

Likelihood of an armed clash between the United States and the PRC

 

Question: According to recent reports, the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty because it needs medium and shorter-range missiles for its standoff with China. Does this mean that we will see an armed conflict between the US and China in the foreseeable future? Did you discuss the likelihood of this development with the Chinese partners?

Answer: The intention of the US to deploy medium and shorter-range ground-based missiles and many other means of warfare is explained by its desire to build up its potential to project force and exert military-political pressure on those who refuse to pander to Washington's hegemonic ambitions and obey its brazen dictates. Certain categories of weapons in the US arsenal are merely the means by which Washington is hoping to preserve its rapidly eroding positions in the changing global alignment of forces.

Other countries are more and more resolutely upholding the principles of equality, polycentricism and indivisible security against the backdrop of this destructive policy.  Faced with this resistance, Washington is becoming even more hostile. This leads to the further aggravation of fundamental interstate disagreements and creates most serious strategic risks, including the threat of a direct nuclear conflict between nuclear powers.

This fully applies to the Asia-Pacific Region where destabilising provocative actions by the US are primarily directed against China, Russia and a number of other countries. Obviously, Washington could go too far in this “muscle flexing” and escalate the situation in the region to the brink of a grave crisis fraught with catastrophic consequences, including at the global level.

For our part, we continue to proceed from our position of principle – it is necessary to eliminate not the symptoms but the root causes of the decline in relations between major world powers. We are very close to our Chinese strategic partners in this respect and are systematically engaged in close coordination of our approaches to international security and strategic stability. That said, we are certainly paying much attention to the negative factors created by the aggressive US policy of double deterrence of Russia and the PRC. This applies, in part, to the problems of ground-based medium and shorter-range missiles.

 

 

Russia’s growing cooperation with African countries

 

Question: Throughout 2023, Russia worked to intensify cooperation with African countries. At the same time, we witnessed a perceptible drop in the traditional influence of France in the region and a surge of anti-French sentiments in a number of countries. What is the fundamental cause of these two processes? What are the prospects for Russia’s relations with countries in the region?

Answer: It is clear that France should look for the reasons behind its waning influence and a rise in anti-French sentiment in Africa in its colonial past and its current post-colonial practices.

It looks like a critical mass of weariness and irritation verging on indignation has built up in some African countries, formerly colonial domains of France, in connection with decades of French neocolonial domination affecting all areas of their life. The notorious Françafrique policy, whose end has been announced by several French presidents, including Emmanuel Macron, is still alive and in effect wherever possible.

However, a growing number of former French colonies are sending unequivocal signals that they are no longer prepared to tolerate and preserve the status quo beneficial for Paris. These countries are seeking to free themselves from its nagging tutelage and condescending diktat. The fine words issuing from the Elysee Palace and ministerial offices mask the easily discernible true intentions of the French elites, who want to continue manipulating the Africans, rope them into their geopolitical games, and pump out natural resources from what they believe is their “historical sphere of influence.”

Those who wish to leave the “friends of France club” immediately fall out of favour and come under heavy criticism on standard grounds like violating democratic principles and human rights, and, worst of all, cooperation with Russia, particularly in the security area. The CAR, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger know this from their own experience.

But it is no longer possible to thwart the Africans’ aspirations for true sovereignty and the right to decide their own future and choose a path of development or partners. Seeking to find the notorious “hand of Moscow” in the current developments, as both France and the West as a whole often do, is ridiculous and senseless: Russia had no embassy in Ouagadougou during the well-known events, nor has it any in Niamey up to this day.   

What Russia really does, without concealing it and even with pride, is to respond to requests for support and help from the leaders of said countries and some other African states, including where it concerns the fight against terrorism and extremism, grain, fertiliser and oil supplies, personnel training, etc. Judging by their grateful reactions, these countries hold this kind of assistance in high regard and view cooperation with Russia as effective and promising. 

All of this fits with the general positive state of the Russian-African partnership which has been ascendant of late. Its strategic trends have been outlined by the decisions of the highly successful second Russia-Africa Summit, held in St Petersburg last July. This partnership involves all countries and multilateral unions in Africa without exception, and covers politics, economics, as well as the social and broadly understood humanitarian spheres of interaction. Therefore, results can be expected in a wide variety of countries and thematic sectors, both traditional for us since the Soviet period and relatively new ones.

 

Relations between Russia and Germany

 

Question: There is talk that current German defence minister, Boris Pistorius, who is much more radical in his attitude towards Russia than the present head of government, may become the next Chancellor of the FRG.  Could more Russophobic politicians come to power in Germany?

Answer: It is not our job to read tea leaves. Neither is it the Russian tradition to “poke our nose” in the internal affairs of other countries, dictate our political preferences to their people, let alone stage “colour” revolutions there. We always have been and will be ready for an honest and open dialogue with any foreign government that comes to power in a legitimate way and is recognised as legitimate by its own citizens. We appreciate our partners’ ability to keep a pragmatic balance between their national interests and those of other international players, including Russia. This is the basic condition for constructive interaction. This refers to the FRG in equal measure. It is another matter that the current political elites in Germany have gone as far as to eliminate the last vestiges of normal relations with the Russian Federation.

 

 

Western pressure on Republika Srpska

 

Question: The West does not relent as it continues to exert pressure on the Republika Srpska. Are the Westerners going down the same path as in Kosovo and Metohija? Does it all not create an impression that the West is in a hurry to resolve all of its issues in the Balkans?

Answer: The Western approach towards the Balkans is transparent, and Russia has no doubt or illusion with regard to it. They are trying to use all available means to create proper conditions for incorporating this geopolitically important region into the sphere of exclusive Euro-Atlantic influence and ultimately turn it into a colony.  The main thrust of their policy aims to undermine international legal instruments that are of key importance for maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans, such as the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) concerning Kosovo. These documents guarantee Serbian interests and are, therefore, in the way of Western capitals. In violation of all rules, the West is pushing for the abolition of the principle of equal rights for the three nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the centralisation of power in Sarajevo. It is encouraging the efforts to militarise Kosovo and sabotaging decisions to create the Community of Serbian Municipalities which deliberately provokes ethnic tensions to feed the narrative that swift alignment with NATO and the EU is the only solution to all problems. It is hard to come up with a more reckless and dangerous policy.

However, things are not going the way Washington, Brussels, or London would like them to. Despite unprecedented external pressure, Serbs act responsibly and independently and demonstrate exceptional resistance in upholding their genuine national interests amid the efforts to impose someone else’s values on them. The people of that region have retained vivid memories of NATO's war crimes against civilians in the Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia in the latter half of the 1990s, and the aftermath of bombing with the use of depleted uranium munitions can still be felt. The cynical and dishonest Western policies regarding Serbia and the Republika Srpska's domestic agenda are also clear for everyone to see.

Facing this challenging situation, Russia continues its principled policy of upholding international law, promoting peace, stability, and security based on internationally recognised principles, and expanding mutually beneficial comprehensive relations with its partners in the Balkans. We rely on historically close bonds of friendship, the overlapping approaches to key regional and global issues and mutual commitment to enhancing cooperation going forward.

 

The Union State of Russia and Belarus

 

Question: What are the outcomes of the Union State of Russia and Belarus’ foreign policy in 2023?

Answer: We continued to strengthen strategic partnership with fraternal Belarus in 2023. The Union State has seen its standing improve significantly and demonstrates maturity and self-sufficiency amid unprecedented pressure by the collective West.

Our integration has significantly expanded and remains a focal point of our cooperation. Significant progress has been made in forming a single economic space by implementing the 28 union programmes that had been approved in 2021. A new package of integration-based solutions for the next three-year period titled Guidelines for Implementing the Provisions of the Treaty Establishing the Union State for 2024–2026 was agreed upon.

Joint efforts by the governments mitigated the aftermath of illegitimate Western sanctions. Mutual trade grew to a record-high $50 billion. Unfettered transit of Belarusian exports to friendly countries was ensured with the use of Russian transport infrastructure. New joint import-substitution projects were launched in agriculture and heavy machinery, machine building, aircraft building, microelectronics, and arms production, to name a few. On November 1, 2023, the most ambitious project, the construction of the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant, was completed, and its second unit was put into operation.

Plans for stepping up the construction of a single Russia-Belarus cultural, humanitarian, scientific and educational, and migration space were coordinated. The importance of patriotic upbringing of youth and the joint preservation of historical memory was emphasised.

Considering the provocative Western policy towards our countries, additional measures were taken to strengthen the common defence and security space of the Union State. Bilateral military and defence cooperation was intensified. Russian tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Belarus, and a bilateral intergovernmental treaty on security guarantees and the security concept of the Union State is being drafted.

We maintain the high level of foreign policy coordination with Belarus. Close interaction and mutual support contributed to effectively upholding common interests in the international arena and played a key role in Russia’s successful EAEU chairmanship and Belarusian CSTO leadership.

The Programme of coordinated actions in foreign policy of the member states of the Treaty Establishing the Union State for 2022-2023 was successfully implemented, and a new similar programme for 2024-2026 was signed following a joint meeting of the respective foreign ministries in Moscow on December 15, 2023. A plan for inter-ministerial consultations in 2024 was signed as well. We will continue to work together to strengthen the CIS and to deepen partnerships with Global South and Global East countries, as well as with constructively-minded regional and interregional associations, particularly the SCO and BRICS.

The year 2024 is expected to be equally eventful and productive for Russian-Belarusian relations. The comprehensive strengthening of the Union State, ensuring its reliable defence, and economic and technological sovereignty remain the undisputed key priorities for us.

This year is special for Russia and Belarus. Both countries are entering an election cycle: the presidential elections in the Russian Federation will take place on March 17; in Belarus, parliamentary and local elections will be held on February 25. The first All-Belarusian People's Assembly (under new rules) will convene in March. We will take all necessary precautions to prevent external interference in our domestic political processes.

We will mark two significant anniversaries in our shared history: the 80th anniversary of Belarus' liberation from German Nazi invaders and the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty Establishing the Union State. The events dedicated to these anniversaries will be held at a high level and highlight the importance of unity between our nations.

 

 

Cooperation with compatriots abroad

 

Question: What about cooperation with compatriots abroad, especially given the new geopolitical realities?

Answer: The hybrid war against Russia, which the collective West has unleashed in a bid to preserve its domination, has complicated the position of the Russian community abroad. Our compatriots in unfriendly countries have continued to face Russophobia and ethnic discrimination, which are essentially new forms of racism and neo-Nazism, as well as attempts to oust the Russian language, reject the achievements of Russian culture and renounce the foundations for the spiritual development of the Russian people.

In these conditions, Russian diplomacy was aimed at providing comprehensive support for the representatives of the diaspora, consolidating them along the lines of patriotism, protecting their lawful rights and interests, preserving their cultural identity and countering attempts to split and discredit the Russian World.

Despite the continued information and psychological pressure and direct threat to well-being and security in some countries, the overwhelming majority of our compatriots have demonstrated unity and taken up an active civil position. They have been promoting a cultural and humanitarian agenda and countering xenophobic attitudes. Overall, we managed to do much by pooling our efforts last year. The steady functioning of the compatriot movement was confirmed by the successful holding of international and local events with support from the Government Commission on the Affairs of Compatriots Abroad (GCACA), the Foreign Ministry of Russia and Russian missions abroad. This applies to five regional and numerous country conferences of our compatriots and four sessions of the World Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots.

The World Thematic Conference took place in Moscow in November 2023. Its theme was as follows: “Strengthening traditional spiritual and moral values - the key to the unity of Russian compatriots.” During this conference, over 180 representatives of the diaspora from 82 countries firmly supported the preservation and protection of moral guidelines. They emphasised the importance of maintaining Russia’s image as one of the main defenders of authentic moral and spiritual values and a traditional family, and an example of interaction between peoples, cultures and religions based on mutual respect and accord. 

Assisted by Russian missions abroad, compatriot organisations in over 120 countries held events devoted to the 78th anniversary of the Victory – wreath-laying ceremonies and work-for-the-nation days at memorials and burial sites of Soviet soldiers, protocol events, concerts, photo exhibitions, film screenings and sports competitions. They focused on the Immortal Regiment event held publicly in 93 countries. All these events are bright examples of the contribution by the Russian community abroad to countering attempts to falsify history and preserving the truth about the Great Patriotic War.

Substantial work is done with the youth of the diaspora. Young compatriots are encouraged to participate in national, regional and international events. There were about 20 such events during the past year. The female side of the compatriot movement became stronger. Last May, Dushanbe hosted the 2nd Eurasian Meeting of Russian Fellow Countrywomen while the Assembly of the World Federation of Russian-Speaking Women took place in Moscow last November.

Human rights issues are rising in importance against the backdrop of numerous cases of criminal and administrative persecution of our compatriots. Russia is helping involve relevant Russian NGOs in this work, primarily the Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad.

A permanent focus of ours is the resettlement of our compatriots. The Foreign Ministry of Russia is actively involved in information support for the state programme on voluntary resettlement of compatriots living abroad to the Russian Federation. In this way, it is helping the Interior Ministry to implement this programme. The following novelties entered into force on January 1 – establishing the institution of repatriation (Presidential Executive Order No. 872 of November 22, 2023) and documented confirmation of the knowledge of the Russian language (Presidential Executive Order No.219 of March 30, 2023). In addition, since the entry into force (on October 26, 2023) of the new Federal Law on the Citizenship of the Russian Federation (No. 138-FZ of April 28, 2023), the participants in the state programme have the right to acquire citizenship bypassing the procedure to obtain a temporary or permanent residence permit.

Our special gratitude goes to the activists of the compatriot movement. They are helping us resolve the large-scale issues involved in consolidating the Russian World in very difficult conditions. There are tens of millions of them with a shared history, culture and spiritual traditions all over the planet. Support for compatriots abroad is a priority of the state policy of the Russian Federation, as established in our Constitution. Russia will continue expanding its partnerships with the Russian diaspora.

 

Advancing relations between Russia and Latin American countries and its approach to developments around Essequibo

 

Question: How are Russia’s relations with Latin American countries and Latin American integration associations developing? What is Russia’s approach towards developments around Essequibo?

Answer: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has a great capacity and is gradually establishing itself as one of the main centres of the multipolar architecture. Russia views Latin America and the Caribbean as a separate civilisational layer.

Our relations with LAC states are developing on a pragmatic, non-ideological, and mutually beneficial basis. We are united by our commitment to the principles of international law and respect for the cultural and civilisational diversity of the world and the right of peoples to determine their own models for their political and socioeconomic structure.

Latin Americans appreciate this approach, especially given the fact that the United States continues to perceive Latin America as its “backyard,” expecting it to get involved in the global confrontation with Russia and China. This explains the unprecedented pressure of the “collective West” on the states of the region, which want to follow their national interests, diversify external contacts, and build up trade and economic ties, including through their expansion with Russia. The economic stability of Latin America, its desire to follow the principle of “unity in diversity,” and the promotion of integration processes in the LAC meet Russia’s interests. Such a view of the fundamentals of cooperation surely makes an impression on Russia’s partners. And that is why not a single Latin American state joined Western anti-Russian sanctions despite all the pressure. Russia is ready for the level and scope of relations for which these countries themselves are ready.

We focus on strengthening ties in all areas both with the states of the region and their associations, including through the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as inter-parliamentary contacts. At the beginning of October 2023, the first Russia – Latin America International Parliamentary Conference was successfully held in Moscow under the auspices of the State Duma. It brought together over 300 delegates from most countries in the region, including heads of legislative bodies.

An important component of Russia’s ties with the LAC states is cooperation in educational, scientific, humanitarian, cultural and sports affairs. A separate area is developed through the media, where the dissemination of objective and comprehensive information about our country and its domestic and foreign policy is of fundamental importance for Russia.

There is a steady increase in the number of Latin American students studying in our country on Russian state scholarships. In addition, Latin America and the Caribbean are popular among Russian tourists. Moreover, Russian tourists do not need visas to visit 27 of the 33 countries in the region.

Russia’s approach to developments around Essequibo is known and has been repeatedly stated. Russia is guided by the principles of the inviolability of international law and the UN Charter, including the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.

This issue lies within the framework of Venezuelan-Guyanese relations and should be resolved in a neighbourly manner, by finding peaceful, mutually acceptable solutions in accordance with international legal norms and agreements signed between the parties, as well as in accordance with current national legislation.

Russia welcomes the fact that Venezuela and Guyana have entered into direct dialogue. The telephone conversation between Foreign Minister of Venezuela Yvan Gil and Foreign Minister of Guyana Hugh Hilton Todd on December 6, 2023 and the meeting between President of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro and President of Guyana Mohamed Irfaan Ali on December 14, 2023 contributed to reducing tensions and strengthening trust in relations between Venezuela and Guyana.

We will continue to advocate the preservation of Latin America as a zone of peace, as proclaimed at the summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in Havana in 2014.

 

Development of Russian-Cuban relations

 

Question: What is the current level of Russian-Cuban relations? What are the prospects for their development? Are there plans to build up partnership relations between Russia and Cuba?

Answer: Cuba is one of Russia’s key allies in the Latin American region. Our relations, based on a solid foundation of historical friendship and solidarity, are not opportunistic and are developing in an upward trajectory. Russia is committed to its unwavering line to strengthen the Russian-Cuban strategic partnership in a comprehensive manner. Undoubtedly, the current international situation has made certain adjustments to the format of our cooperation, but we have adapted to the new realities.

Moscow notes the excellent level of political dialogue, which consistently confirms our readiness to respond promptly to our partners’ requests and to seek compromise solutions.

We attach great importance to the development of trade, economic, financial and investment cooperation with Havana. Active work in this area is being carried out through the Intergovernmental Russian-Cuban Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Together we are successfully implementing priority projects in such areas as metallurgy, energy, transport, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. This year we are preparing for the 21st meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission in Moscow.

Cultural and humanitarian exchanges are developing progressively. The 100 Scholarships programme is underway and enjoys a lot of interest and support on behalf of our partners. We expect that they will continue to make their significant contribution to resolving the challenges facing Havana.

Russia appreciates the truly comradely co-operation between our countries in the international arena. We are in solidarity in our positions on key issues on the global agenda, which are based on an almost complete synchronisation of approaches, including establishment of a just and multipolar world order. Both states actively participate in the activities of the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter.

Russia appreciates that Havana has spoken openly and consistently about the causes of the crisis escalation in Ukraine, noting the responsibility of the United States and NATO, which have pursued a policy of bringing the Alliance's military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders.

Moscow has consistently expressed support to its Cuban partners for the immediate lifting of the illegitimate trade, economic and financial embargo against the island, as well as the removal of the Republic of Cuba from the US administration's arbitrary list of state sponsors of terrorism, reiterated during the vote on November 2 last year on the Cuban draft resolution of the UN General Assembly on the “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.” The Cuban people are steadfastly defending the right to choose their own path of development despite unprecedented pressure from the United States.

Russia will continue to fully support Cuba in defence of its independence and sovereignty.

 

 

 Possibility of an “Asian NATO”

 

Question: The United States is exerting pressure on India regarding purchases of Russian oil and is attempting to interfere in elections in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and other countries. Could South Asia become another “foothold” for the United States to create an “Asian NATO” to counter China?

Answer: Russia has been contributing to ensuring India's energy security for many years now. Along with the implementation of the Kudankulam NPP project, energy exports are essential components of this work. The Indian companies refine the oil they buy from us at a good price and consistently enhance their competitiveness on the global market. Meanwhile, Washington and its satellites aim to take this advantage away from our partners.

Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has more than once commented on the US efforts to influence the election campaign in Bangladesh. In particular, in October 2023, US Ambassador to Bangladesh Peter Haas blatantly abused his diplomatic status and discussed setting up anti-government protests at a meeting with a local opposition leader. To exert pressure on the government led by Sheikh Hasina, which the Americans find objectionable, the US State Department denied a number of officials entry to the United States. However, as expected, the Bangladeshi voters had the final say and most of them voted for the ruling Awami League.

We do not have information about direct US intervention in the electoral processes in Nepal and Pakistan. We hope that the Pakistani government will secure the proper environment for a free expression of the will of the voters during the upcoming national elections on February 8.

The West's push to impose its NATO-approved Indo-Pacific doctrine on individual South Asian countries is undoubtedly there, and Russia sees it. However, clearly, the sub-region has no need for external mentors, especially military mentors. Moreover, India and Pakistan are important participants in the processes involved in building a non-aligned space of trans-boundary interconnectivity and operate in other formats with a positive and constructive agenda, such as the SCO. Other sub-regional players, who are interested in addressing vital matters of sustainable development and prosperity, pursue similar goals.

If we take a broader look at the situation, active attempts by the United States and its allies to break up the regional security architecture and to expand NATO’s geographical presence can be discussed in the context of East Asia. A pool of special NATO partners − Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand − has been formed in this part of the world. Not only are they ready to contribute to fulfilling NATO goals, but they also seek to lead the Southeast Asian countries astray.

 

Measures to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States

 

Question: What are your plans to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states?

Answer: In recent years, the Baltic states have pursued a policy of removing Russian from their cultural and media space. Russian language teaching at schools and preschools has been cut down significantly, Russian-language schools have been closed, and migration legislation is being amended in order to exert pressure on the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states.

The Russian side construes the unfriendly countries’ decisions to restrict instruction in Russian and to deprive ethnic minorities of the opportunity to preserve their native languages and culture as discrimination against our compatriots on linguistic and ethnic grounds. This grossly violates fundamental international legal norms, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the European Convention on Human Rights, to name  a few.

Within the scope of their authority, Russian diplomatic missions provide the necessary consular and legal support to Russian citizens. All cases of discrimination against Russian citizens and representatives of our diaspora are documented. The missions work on them with the local authorities, and reach out to the media and human rights organisations, as well as to the relevant international agencies. Much effort goes into implementing the State program on rendering assistance to voluntary resettlement to the Russian Federation of the compatriots living abroad. Thanks to this programme, resettlers have access to a wide range of support measures, including one-time benefits, help with employment and temporary accommodation, the right to import vehicles duty-free, and much more.

Furthermore, Russia is working to draw the attention of the international community to the inhumane migration requirements imposed by the Latvian authorities on our compatriots. The Commission on International Cooperation of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights has sent petitions to the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe calling for the protection of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia from expulsion.

 

Interaction within the CIS

 

Question: Interaction within the CIS. The Russian chairmanship’s priorities in 2024.

Answer: In 2023, systematic work continued with the aim of developing cooperation in every major area, in the format of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Over 60 documents related to the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian spheres as well as security were adopted, including six joint political statements on relevant international issues.

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on free trade in services, as well as on investment activities at a meeting of the CIS Heads of Government Council in Sochi on June 8, 2023. The document is designed to ensure a favourable investment climate and protect the rights of investors by expanding the free trade regime to services. The regime has been in force in the CIS since October 18, 2011, as part of the Free Trade Zone Agreement.

Much was accomplished on the cultural and humanitarian track in 2023. The Year of the Russian Language as a language of interethnic communication was held, culminating in the signing of an agreement to establish the International Russian Language Organisation during the meeting of the CIS Heads of Government Council in Bishkek, on October 13, 2023. The CIS leaders also adopted the Statement on Support and Promotion of the Russian Language as a Language of Interethnic Communication.

Naturally, the practice of holding themed years will be continued. We welcome the launch of the Year of Volunteer Movement in the CIS in 2024, which took place in Moscow in December 2023 as part of the #WeAreTogether international civic participation forum.

St Petersburg has honourably carried the title of the Cultural Capital of the Commonwealth; this year, the title was passed on to the ancient Uzbek city of Samarkand. The 9th St Petersburg International Cultural Forum – United Cultures Forum, which took place last November, became a landmark event.

The close and fruitful interaction of people engaged in culture, science and education from the CIS countries continued. The benchmark was the 16th Forum of Creative and Scientific Intellectuals, themed Through the Interaction of Cultures to Commonwealth and Peace, held in Bishkek in September 2023. This year, Russia will host the 17th forum.

Among the new initiatives is the decision to implement the Youth Capital of the CIS international project, with Tashkent being the designated host in 2024. Additionally, the Commonwealth Sports Capitals project has been launched.

Human rights issues too were a central focus.

The Human Rights Commission and the Commission of Children’s Rights Commissioners (Ombudsmen) began their work.

Russia assumed chairmanship of the CIS on January 1, 2024. The Chairmanship Concept, adopted by the President of Russia, outlines our priorities for further cooperation within the CIS.

Special attention will be paid to deepening economic integration, boosting foreign political coordination, improving the mechanisms for jointly combatting traditional and new challenges and threats, expanding cultural and humanitarian ties, and improving the image of the CIS on the global stage.

The action plan for implementing the Chairmanship Concept includes about 150 clauses and covers all the main areas of CIS activity.

As the Chair, we plan to continue active cooperation with our CIS partners, fostering an atmosphere of equality and mutual respect.

 

Prospects for a resumption of the Russian-US dialogue on strategic stability

 

Question: What are the prospects for resuming the Russian-US dialogue on strategic stability? Do these prospects exist at all, even in theory?

Answer: Prospects for resuming the strategic dialogue with the United States cannot be considered in isolation from the general state of affairs in the area of international security and strategic stability. Today, strongly negative dynamics persist in that sphere, primarily as a result of the intensified struggle surrounding the historic processes that are accompanying the shift in the world order from the unipolar hegemony to a polycentric system. The US-led Western countries are fiercely opposing the transition to a multipolar world order in an attempt to hold onto their slipping global domination. They do not feel constrained in their choice of means of exerting pressure on those who are averse to Washington’s hegemonic manners and uphold the principle of equality.

While attempting to preserve its undivided world supremacy, Washington has run into an insurmountable obstacle, Russia, which has displayed resolve to prevent others from impinging upon its interests as a great power and one of the world civilisation centres. The degree of US hostility grew in proportion to the firmness of our position. Washington’s policy of encouraging the unrestrained expansion of the anti-Russian North Atlantic alliance into the post-Soviet space provoked the Ukrainian conflict. Russia refused to put up with the use of the Kiev regime as a tool for creating direct security threats directly on our border. In response to Russia’s measures to defend its external security perimeter, the United States and its allies have unleashed an all-out hybrid war aimed at Russia’s political and economic strangulation and at subjecting it to a “strategic defeat” on the battlefield.  This is a publicly declared Western strategy.

The United States and NATO are not in the least interested in a just settlement of the current conflict. They are clearly unprepared to heed Russia’s concerns and work in earnest to remove the fundamental contradictions. On the contrary, the West seeks to escalate the Ukraine crisis, which is creating the main strategic risks because this course is fraught with a slide into a direct military clash between the nuclear powers with disastrous consequences. 

The United States’ destructive policy has led to a thorough degradation in Russian-US relations and a drastic change in security conditions. Washington has arrogantly trampled on and cast aside all the understandings whereupon our two countries agreed to promote cooperation, including on arms control. The preamble to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty says that the parties have agreed on a shared commitment to the indivisibility-of-security principle and on a relationship built upon trust and cooperation. But in reality, the United States had long ago opted for attaining unilateral military superiority. In a bid to gain a freehand, it step by step dismantled the system of arms control agreements by either withdrawing from the relevant treaties (ABM Treaty, INF Treaty, Treaty on Open Skies) or by creating unacceptable conditions for implementing those treaties, as was the case with the CFE Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

It was the US that froze the bilateral strategic dialogue under the pretext of an “unfavourable military and political environment.” Not so long ago, however, the Americans suddenly woke up to the importance of nuclear arms control. They started sending us signals, including on paper, that they were supposedly ready to resume dialogue on these issues. Moreover, they suggested that we seal off the negotiations from the openly hostile military and political context, into which the United States had plunged our relations.

The US objective is clear: they want to gain control over Russia’s nuclear arsenal under the pretext of reciprocity and minimise the nuclear risks resulting from them bringing armed pressure to bear on our country in a manner that verges on direct military interference. Moreover, they are not concealing their plan to “factor out” the non-nuclear component of military confrontation and consolidate the overall advantage available to the collective West in this sphere.

Given the current developments, we regard the US ideas as absurd and totally unacceptable. In a situation where Washington is engaged in a hybrid aggression against Russia, there is no reason for taking any additional joint measures in the area of arms control and strategic risk reduction or for generally discussing strategic stability with the United States.

Prospectively, Russia certainly does not reject the actual idea of arms control or the possibility of political and diplomatic settlement of the existing differences. But it firmly makes this conditional on the West’s preliminary renunciation of its malicious course for an all-out disruption of Russia’s security and its demonstrative lack of respect for our core interests. In addition, any hypothetical future interaction on the strategic agenda would require the United States to display readiness to thoroughly consider the matter, with account taken of all significant factors in their interconnection rather than only those that are of interest to Washington. Specifically, it would be necessary to remove the critically important security-related differences arising from NATO’s eastern expansion, which poses a direct and grave threat to Russia.

Russia’s principled approaches were conveyed to the Americans via diplomatic channels in December 2023 in response to their earlier written proposals. For us, there is no alternative to the assessments outlined there. Russia proceeds from the premise that nothing has been left unstated concerning this issue.

 

Prospects for normalising relations between Russia and the Western countries

 

Question: Are there any prospects for normalising relations with the West in the current escalation?

Answer: Russia’s relations with the collective West are in a state of profound decline. There is no normal dialogue between our countries. Confrontation fills all spheres of interstate interaction.

The United States is the main inspirer, organiser and executor of the aggressive anti-Russia policy for the collective West and the source of the main risks to the security of the Russian Federation and international peace. And the Europeans have obediently toed the line.

An all-out hybrid war is being waged against Russia in order to inflict a “strategic defeat” on us. The criminal regime in Kiev is being given comprehensive military support, our country is under unprecedented sanctions pressure, and there are plans to heavily influence the socio-political situation.

Under such conditions, nothing can be ruled out, including the possibility of further developments under the most negative scenarios. For its part, Russia is ready for any developments.

As far as normalising relations is concerned, the main criterion for this is rejection of the aggressive policy towards Russia aimed at threatening our security, territorial integrity and sovereignty, undermining domestic political stability, eroding traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, as well as hindering our cooperation with our allies and partners.

We are realists. We cannot count on any change in the paradigm of thinking that currently prevails in Washington and Brussels. We see no objective prerequisites that could lead to this.

At the same time, it is important to understand that normalising relations with the West is not an end in itself for Russia. We unequivocally prioritise strengthening cooperation with the global majority, not with those countries that have publicly declared us an adversary. We see a sincere willingness on the part of our partners among the leading players in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America to build relations based on the principles of mutual respect and benefit. Together with them, we are working to develop an alternative infrastructure for mutual financial transactions, interbank links, trade routes and logistics corridors that are independent of the West.

 

Russia-Finland relations

 

Question: Finland recently announced that it will once again close the entire border with Russia until February 11. Is the Russian Federation considering a reciprocal step, that is, closing all border crossings for an indefinite period? What other measures could there be? How does Russia assess future relations with Finland in general?

Answer: For many decades, Russian-Finnish relations were based on the principles of constructive, mutually beneficial cooperation with regard to each other’s interests. They were marked by regular political dialogue at all levels, high mutual trade, and intensive cultural and humanitarian exchanges. All of this created the impression, at least in Russia, that Finland was the country with which we had no issues. We felt a mutual intent for neighbourly and constructive interaction.

In 2012, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was even invited to speak in Helsinki at a regular meeting of Finnish ambassadors and permanent representatives. The bullet points of that speech are still relevant. Twelve years ago, he spoke about the essential supremacy of international law in global affairs and the futility of attempts to ensure the security of one country at the expense of another. He said the so-called collective West needed to abandon its policy of expansion towards Russia and adopt a strategy of counteracting international crises with Russia instead.

It is noteworthy that in private conversations as well as publicly, official representatives of Finland used to assure us about the priority of maintaining good relations with Russia.

But today, the entire system of bilateral Russian-Finnish ties has been completely destroyed. This is the fault of the Finnish side.

After Russia launched the special military operation, Finland began conducting an aggressive and confrontational anti-Russia policy, including active support for the Kiev regime, in particular, by supplying it with weapons and military equipment. It also consistently speaks in favour of strengthening the sanctions pressure against our country. In April 2023, Finland officially joined the NATO military block, which is openly hostile towards Russia, abandoning the many-year policy of military non-alignment, which was an efficient foundation for maintaining national security. When independent of any bloc, Finland improved its image in international affairs by being an important platform for negotiations where key issues of the contemporary world were discussed. Now, with Finland almost completely losing a big part of its national sovereignty, there is no more talk about the reputation of the Finns on the global stage.

When reading statements by Finnish officials that indicate that they have always been wary of Russia, we are amazed by their hypocrisy. It does not matter whether they lied before when they pretended to be good neighbours and assured us of their desire to build mutually beneficial cooperation, or if they are lying now, pretending that the decades of constructive partner relations never existed.

As for the defence cooperation agreement, signed by Finland and the US late last year, we have already provided our assessments to the Finnish party and the public. Russia will not leave an increased NATO military presence near its borders unanswered and will take the necessary measures to counteract any aggressive step by Finland and its NATO allies. The responsibility of turning a zone of stability and security in the North European region into a zone of potential confrontation lies with the current Finnish authorities.

 

Russia’s relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea

 

Question: What are the prospects of Russia’s relations with South Korea and North Korea in 2024? Did the friendly actions of Russia and North Korea help relieve the tensions on the Korean Peninsula last year?

Answer: It will not be an exaggeration to say that 2023 was a historic year for relations between Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The talks between President Vladimir Putin and President of State Affairs of North Korea Kim Jong Un at the Vostochny Cosmodrome on September 13, 2023, and their outcome indicated that Moscow and Pyongyang are interested in taking their bilateral cooperation to a qualitatively new level.

The two countries have intensified delegation exchanges. In October 2023, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid an official visit to Pyongyang where he was received by the leader of North Korea Kim Jong Un, and also had talks with his counterpart Choe Son-hui. In November 2023, the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation in Trade, the Economy, Science and Technology held its tenth meeting. In December 2023, a delegation from the Primorye Territory, headed by Governor Oleg Kozhemyako, visited North Korea. In October 2023, North Korean Minister of Physical Culture and Sport Kim Il-guk visited Russia and attended the Russia – A Sport Power Forum in Perm. In November, Minister of Culture Sung Jong-gyu attended the 9th Forum of United Cultures in St Petersburg.

There has been certain progress in our practical cooperation. In particular, Russia-North Korea trade grew to $29.4 million over the first ten months of 2023, compared to $3.78 million in 2022. The cooperation potential in this area is far from being exhausted.

In 2023, the once friendly relations between Russian and South Korea were put to the test. In solidarity with the collective West over the Ukrainian conflict, Seoul introduced anti-Russia financial and economic sanctions, essentially froze delegation exchanges and suspended the majority of joint investment projects. As of late, South Korea has upped the ante on the anti-Russia rhetoric, groundlessly accusing us of military-technical cooperation with Pyongyang.

However, many in South Korea understand that it is important to steer cooperation with our country onto a healthy development trajectory. South Korean businesses realise this as they never officially announced leaving the Russian market, in order to retain the ability to restore lost cooperation in some practical fields. One telling example is the re-opening of the Hyundai Motor car plant near St Petersburg after a two-year break.

For its part, Moscow is interested in working with Seoul to preserve the potential of our bilateral cooperation and create conditions for further progress in more favourable international circumstances to the extent that our South Korean partners are willing to do the same.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula became notably more complicated in 2023. The tension was mainly escalated by the military activity of the United States, South Korea and Japan whose joint military exercise was the largest in recent years. Some components of US strategic potential are essentially stationed in the sub-region on a permanent basis, which North Korea considers nothing less than preparations for aggressive actions. In these circumstances, Pyongyang is forced to take measures to ensure security and protect the country’s sovereignty. The result is a dangerous spiral of confrontation. This new phase of adversarial activity continues to gather momentum in 2024, fuelling the hostile climate. It is clearly seen in the rhetoric of the parties exchanging threats of mutual elimination.

No prospects of resuming talks are visible in the current circumstances. That being said, sanctions and demonstrations of force will not create prerequisites for a political and diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue and other problems on the Korean Peninsula. Russia and China have consistently called for the United States and its allies to abandon their bloc-oriented mindset in favour of a mutually respectful dialogue with North Korea. If the Americans were genuinely interested in establishing long-term peace and stability on the peninsula, they would not have rejected Russia-China initiatives – specifically, the roadmap and the action plan, as well as a draft UNSC political and humanitarian resolution. The documents contain specific steps to unblock the talks and make progress towards building an integrated architecture of indivisible security in Northeast Asia. 

 

 

Syrian settlement

 

Question: The situation in and around Syria. What efforts is Russia taking to settle it?

Answer: We are taking comprehensive efforts in the interest of a comprehensive settlement in Syria based on the strict compliance with the principles of respecting the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the country.

Syria’s return to the Arab family after resuming its full participation in the activities of the Arab League was an important positive result of 2023. We hope that Damascus restoring its traditional mutually beneficial relations with other Arab capitals will help achieve long-term stabilisation in Syria.

Our efforts to restore Syrian-Turkish state-to-state relations are also aimed at normalising the republic’s ties with its regional community. Moscow has organised several meetings in the Russia-Iran-Syria-Turkiye format, including between foreign and defence ministers. We intend to further promote Syrian-Turkish rapprochement as an important component of creating favourable conditions for a comprehensive settlement around the Syrian Arab Republic.

Together with its Iranian and Turkish partners, Russia continues its work within the Astana format, which has proven to be the only effective multilateral stewardship mechanism in the intra-Syrian settlement process. Thanks to the agreements reached on the Astana platform, it has been possible to maintain a cessation of hostilities in Syria between government forces and armed opposition groups for several years now.

In September 2023, consultations between the foreign ministers of the three guarantor countries were held on the sidelines of the high-level week of the 78th UN General Assembly, with Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria Geir Pedersen joining. On January 24-25, Astana hosted a regular international meeting on Syria.

The illegal US military presence is the main destabilising factor for Syria. The Americans have been preventing the central authorities from restoring control in the Trans-Euphrates region for a long time and are fuelling separatist sentiments there. Washington’s policies have already provoked escalating disputes between the Kurds and local Arab tribes, which resulted in violent clashes with many victims.

The deteriorating humanitarian and socioeconomic situation is the main challenge for Syrians today. In fact, the Westerners did not abandon their plans to change the “regime” they did not like in Syria. Having failed in their attempts to overthrow Bashar al-Assad by force, they switched to the tactics of economic strangulation. This policy of the United States and its satellites does not allow the Syrians to begin quickly and effectively rebuilding their country after many years of armed conflict, and prevents the return of millions of Syrian refugees to their homeland.

Under these conditions, Russia is using every opportunity to provide assistance to Syria both bilaterally and multilaterally. The Permanent Russian-Syrian Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation is functioning successfully.

On October 27, 2023, an intergovernmental Agreement on expanding trade and economic cooperation was signed in Moscow.

 

Cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan

 

Question: On January 3, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in an interview with leading Kazakh publications, paid special attention to relations between Kazakhstan and Russia. “Russia is the most important partner and ally of Kazakhstan.” How do you assess this statement?

Answer: Russia and Kazakhstan are united not only by the longest land border in the world (7,500 km), but also by a common history, cultural heritage, close multifaceted ties, and similar approaches and interests in the international arena.

The countries have built relations of truly strategic partnership and alliance. Their privileged nature is confirmed by intensive political contacts, including at the highest level.

The main political event of last year was the official visit of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the Republic of Kazakhstan on November 9. The heads of state signed a detailed Statement devoted to the 10th anniversary of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on Good Neighbourliness and Alliance in the 21st century, and approved a Joint Action Plan for 2024-2026 setting strategic objectives. The agreements reached in Astana are extremely important for promoting our common foreign policy, trade and economic interests.

We support intensive Russian-Kazakhstani dialogue at all levels within the EAEU, CSTO, CIS, and SCO. We plan to start this year without any delay: Russia, as CIS chair, has something to offer its partners. Another event is the Russia-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum (the latest meeting was held on November 9, 2023, chaired by the presidents of the two countries). And this is not surprising, as cross-border trade accounts for about 70 percent of bilateral trade.

Russia pays priority attention to the development of trade and economic relations with Kazakhstan, our important trading partner. Mutual trade shows steady growth. Despite any difficulties, we are close to the figure of no less than 3 trillion rubles. Investment interaction is also actively developing (69 investment projects totalling about 2.44 trillion rubles are being implemented in Kazakhstan).

We can see that Russian businesses show more interest in implementing projects in Kazakhstan, just like Kazakhstani businesses are looking forward to implementing projects in Russia. Entrepreneurs of both countries interact in literally all sectors of the economy.

Industrial cooperation is deepening, with a number of significant business agreements signed: construction of Tatneft plants for manufacturing tires, rubber and road bitumen; joint production of the Baikal light multi-purpose aircraft; setting up the assembly production of Russian helicopters, trucks and cars, as well as agricultural machinery. In the mid-term, our joint plans include the implementation of 23 ambitious projects in the automotive, aviation, light, chemical, petrochemical and metallurgical industries in Kazakhstan.

Thus, cooperation between our countries is distinguished by its quality and active involvement in mutually beneficial joint production and transport and logistics projects. We are also improving our cooperation in the transport sector. Work is underway to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor. In the future, it will be capable of providing transit of up to 30 million tonnes of cargo annually.

We are convinced that the strategic partnership and deepening integration ties between Moscow and Astana fully meet the interests of the peoples of the two countries and serve as a guarantee of prosperity and stability. I would like to express confidence that our coordinated economic policy and coordinated policy in the international arena make us stronger in the face of any challenges.

We are satisfied with the status of Russian compatriots living in the Republic of Kazakhstan. We appreciate the efforts of the Kazakhstani side to maintain interethnic harmony and ensure the equality of rights and freedoms for all citizens of this multinational country, of which the Russian-speaking community is an integral part. Our common memory and heroic history are the fundamental foundations of the strategic partnership and alliance of the two states.

 

Russia-China Cooperation

 

Question: China and Russia have hit the target of increasing mutual trade to $200 billion in just the first 11 months of 2023. This is, perhaps, the key economic outcome of the year for both countries. How much stronger have mutual trust and strategic cooperation between Russia and China become in the process? What are the most important diplomatic outcomes?

Answer: The year 2023 was exceptionally productive for Russian-Chinese relations. The comprehensive strategic partnership between our countries continued to deepen. Moscow and Beijing provided decisive mutual support on crucial issues affecting national interests, strengthened practical cooperation and humanitarian ties, and restored in-person contacts following the pandemic.

Top-level diplomacy played a key role in shaping our relations. Following his reelection as President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping made his first foreign visit to our country in March 2023. In October 2023, President Vladimir Putin, as the guest of honour, participated in the 3rd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, and the leaders held separate full-fledged talks on its sidelines. The summits resulted in important agreements to strengthen our multifaceted ties for years to come which meets the interests of our respective nations. Large-scale practical work to implement them is underway, including within the well-functioning mechanism for regular meetings between the heads of governments of Russia and China. In 2023, the prime ministers of both countries met in person three times. Despite challenging international circumstances, cooperation between our nations withstood the strength test and demonstrated a high degree of resilience and adaptability. Most joint programmes and projects are on track to be completed on time or even ahead of schedule.

Over the past year, bilateral trade grew by over 25 percent and easily surpassed the $200-billion mark that the leaders initially planned to achieve in 2024. Over 90 percent of payments are now made in national currencies. In fact, bilateral economic relations have been completely de-dollarised. Country-wide (if we exclude supranational entities such as the EU or ASEAN, or special regions like Hong Kong and Taiwan), Russia is China’s fourth-largest trading partner trailing behind only the United States, Japan, and South Korea. In 2023, Russia made a significant leap rising by four positions and overtaking Australia, Germany, Malaysia, and Vietnam. This is striking proof that Russia and China are becoming important partners.

Partnership in industry, finance, and the investment sector, as well as in transport and logistics, is expanding. Interaction in the energy sector is steadily growing, with good dynamics in the supply of Russian agricultural products on the Chinese market. In 2023, many Chinese companies came to our country, which fact we welcome and support.

We are consistently working to prevent the risks of unfriendly influences on the multifaceted bilateral partnership amid the illegal restrictive measures imposed on Russia and China. Given the circumstances, the increasingly strong and highly professional interaction between our respective parliaments is playing a crucial role. Our legislators are working hard to neutralise the extraterritorial impact of Western sanctions on Russian-Chinese practical cooperation. We highly appreciate the outcomes of the visits by the speakers of both chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Valentina Matviyenko and Vyacheslav Volodin, to China in 2023, as well as the collaborative efforts of the relevant parliamentary committees and commissions.

Contacts between parties and civic organisations are quite extensive. We attach great importance to events commemorating the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between our countries established on October 2, 1949, and will mark this significant milestone accordingly.

Humanitarian and region-to-region contacts are quite extensive. Student and tourist exchanges, as well as concert tours and art exhibition exchanges, have seen a noticeable revival following the pandemic. The Years of Russian-Chinese Sports Cooperation, comprising over 400 joint events, were a success. As per the leaders' decision, 2024 and 2025 have been declared cross years of culture. I firmly believe that the cultural exchange programme will be very popular in our countries, further strengthen the social foundation of bilateral relations and promote friendly contacts between the peoples of Russia and China.

Mutual support in matters of core interests, especially the protection of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and state security are an important part of Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation.

Russia consistently supports Beijing in the dispute over Taiwan, considering it China's domestic affair, where China is entitled to take every step that it deems necessary to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Moscow and Beijing working in tandem in the foreign policy arena has a stabilising effect and contributes significantly to democratising the international relations system. We support effective dialogue on regional and global security, as well as strategic stability. Our military and military-technical cooperation is making strides. Importantly, Russia and China are not building a military alliance reminiscent of the Cold War era, and our interaction is free from confrontation or bloc-oriented elements. As President Putin made clear, the friendship between our two countries is not directed against anyone, but relies on our national interests and is beneficial to the peoples of our countries and the world at large. This model of relations has become an attractive alternative for our numerous like-minded partners.

Russia and China oppose the Western actors’ attempts to promote their rules-based order which undermines the UN-centric international order. We are combatting modern forms of colonialism practiced by those who strive to perpetuate their hegemony that are meant to bring independent growth centres under control. We plan to continue working closely with our Chinese friends, including within the UN, the SCO, BRICS, the G20, and other multilateral forums. Broad prospects are opening up in the wake of the recent expansion of BRICS, and Russia assuming the BRICS chairmanship.

We highly appreciate China's balanced position on Ukraine and its willingness to contribute to the search for a political and diplomatic solution to the crisis. As the special operation has proceeded, our Chinese partners have remained objective regarding the developments in the conflict zone, proceeding as they do from an impartial analysis of history and principled assessments of the current phase of the conflict, fully mindful of the role of Western powers, primarily the United States, in escalating tensions in the region.

 

 

Russia’s response to the supply of F-16 fighters to Ukraine by the Netherlands

 

Question: What is Russia’s response to the supplies of F-16 fighters to Ukraine by the Netherlands?

Answer: We have heard statements by Dutch officials about their readiness to provide F-16 fighters to Ukraine. There have also been leaks about the number of fighters they plan to supply and possible dates.  However, in any event, it is clear to Russia that these deliveries will not affect the course of the special military operation in any way. We remember the high hopes the Ukrainian authorities and their overseas curators placed on the much-vaunted Western armour, most of which went up in smoke during the failed counteroffensive.

Our concern lies elsewhere. The Dutch authorities and their partners in the “fighter jet coalition” are becoming increasingly entangled in the conflict in Ukraine, driven by their unbridled desire to demonstrate unwavering support for Ukraine, and continue to pump it with increasingly lethal weapons and equipment. In fact, they are becoming accomplices in the war crimes committed by the Kiev regime. The Hague and other European capitals need to understand that these irresponsible moves only prolong and intensify the hostilities, resulting in the loss of civilian lives. These capitals are ultimately multiplying the risks of a direct armed confrontation between Russia and NATO, which clearly does not serve Europe’s security interests.

The situation is particularly cynical given that Kiev will be receiving fighter jets that have reached the end of their service life. In the meantime, the Netherlands is buying new F-35s from the US for its Air Force. This demonstrates the unscrupulous pragmatism of the Western curators of the criminal regime in Kiev. It is becoming increasingly obvious with time that this regime is all about money and blood. 

These reckless actions violate legal and moral standards and run counter to the fundamental interests of the Dutch people. By engaging in such behaviour, the Netherlands is again discrediting itself and demonstrating its inability to act as an independent and responsible international player. In this sense, the Netherlands is only harming itself.

 

 

Russian-Saudi cooperation under the OPEC+ agreement

 

Question: How do Moscow and Riyadh cooperate in reducing oil production under the OPEC+ agreement? Will their cooperation impact the global market?

Answer: The OPEC+ format is making a decisive contribution to creating a stable and predictable global oil market. This cooperation helps maintain a steady balance between supply and demand, which is reflected in the prices that are acceptable for both producers and buyers. Meanwhile, Western countries, accustomed to manipulating oil prices to suit their political expediency, are now compelled to consider the agreements in the OPEC+ format that have proved their efficiency in the past few years. The decisions made within this framework are exclusively dictated by economic considerations and are not aimed against anyone. Russia-Saudi cooperation in this area is mutually beneficial and built on trust.

 

Russia’s response measures to the blocking of its property in the Czech Republic

 

Question: Will Russia take measures in response to the blocking by the Czech Republic of the Russian real estate in the country? Will these measures concern the Czech House in Moscow?

Answer: In November 2023, the Czech authorities decided to ban the management and use of many Russian facilities, including diplomatic properties, on Czech territory. In light of this, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a strong statement to the Czech Republic, qualifying these arbitrary actions as unacceptable.

Naturally, Russia will protect its lawful interests through all available means. We are currently focusing on legal mechanisms. However, this does not rule out possible response measures as regards Czech property assets in Russia.

We urge our Czech colleagues to abandon their predatory business methods.