



COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
AND DEFENCE POLICY



RUSSIA
IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS

NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY–
HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs
Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

A stylized world map in a light blue color, composed of a grid of dots, serving as a background for the title.

Russia's Policy Towards World Majority

Moscow, 2023



Source: https://rgo.ru/upload/content_block/images/2ece13459c89877dc5063bee9a2d5496/022248d5a698887778488af3f2639a72.jpg?itok=t3O-M-nj (Ruslan Olinchuk, RGO)

This report was prepared following a series of studies, conferences, and situational analysis sessions conducted under the situational analysis program by the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the Higher School of Economics, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and Russia in Global Affairs journal with support from the State Duma Committee on International Affairs and under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation¹.

Program Supervisor	– Sergei A. KARAGANOV
Program Director	– Alexander M. KRAMARENKO

Team of Authors

Sergei A. KARAGANOV – Professor Emeritus, Academic Supervisor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Head of the Situational Analysis Program; executive editor².

Alexander M. KRAMARENKO – Director, Institute of Actual International Problems, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.

Dmitry V. TRENIN – Research Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University-Higher School of Economics; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; lead author.

Number ISBN – 978-5-6050740-3-8

1 See Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 for the lists of participants in the preliminary conference and the situational analysis session. The authors thank the colleagues who provided academic and technical support in organizing the situational analysis session and writing the final report.

2 Responsibility for the final text of the report rests entirely with the executive editor.

Table of Contents

Introduction	5
1. Two Spaces of Russian Foreign Policy	9
2. World Majority Phenomenon.....	14
3. Basic Principles of Russia's Approach Towards the World Majority.....	18
4. Key Functional Aspects of Russia's Strategy Towards the World Majority.....	20
5. Priorities: the Institutional Aspect	23
6. Russian Policy: the Value Aspect	24
7. Crucial Aspects of the New Policy With Regard to Some Regions of the World Majority	25
8. Practical Steps: Broad Maneuver with Resources	32
Appendix 1.....	39
Appendix 2.....	40

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to work out the basic principles, guidelines, and goals for interaction with the World Majority³, including an agenda for global development and world politics as an alternative to the existing one. Regional and country issues should be studied separately.

Since the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine, the Russian foreign policy space has split in two. On the one hand, a U.S.-led coalition of several dozen states, which keeps taking new punitive measures against Russia, is seeking to isolate our country politically and economically and is actively involved in a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. On the other hand, there is the rest of the world: more than a hundred countries that de facto have taken a neutral position on the Ukraine conflict, and many have assumed a benevolent (“constructive” according to the terminology of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept) attitude towards Moscow, continuing to trade and maintain various contacts. The World Majority is not the anti-West, although objectively its needs are contrary to Western interests as they are stated by the present globalist elites.

For the most part, the countries of the Global South and East are Russia’s natural associates in democratizing the world order, eradicating neocolonial practices, and banning instruments of pressure and blackmail from the world political, monetary, and financial systems.

The main sources of our development and possibilities to influence the international environment lie outside the Western world. The World Majority is important per se, and interaction with it requires using network diplomacy methods and creating open (and variable) ad hoc alliances based on shared interests. This work is becoming a key area of Russian diplomacy.

There is an objective contradiction between the multipolarity/polycentricity of the emerging world order and the ability to ensure the equality of all states, primarily small ones. To smooth it out, world politics and global development need to be regionalized, with the main activity to be shifted to regional clusters.

The main conflict of the modern world stems from a contradiction between the desire of the U.S.-led West to preserve its five-century-long hegemony, which allowed it to redistribute world wealth in its favor, impose its cultural and political principles on the whole world, on the one hand, and the striving of non-Western countries towards full-fledged sovereignty, not constrained by Western dogmas, institutions and orders, on the other. Only such sovereignty can ensure free development and a fair share in the global economy.

3 The term ‘World Majority’ used in this report means a community of non-Western countries that have no binding relationships with the United States and the organizations it patronizes. This definition needs further clarification, but for the purposes of this publication it can be used as a working option. The use of the term ‘Global Majority’ is undesirable, as it refers to the liberal globalization concept from the previous stage.

The SMO has become a turning point and catalyzed these trends, testing countries' readiness to develop independently and defend their national interests. The armed conflict in Ukraine has already led to the emergence of the World Majority as a clearly defined phenomenon in international relations.

Russia should position itself as a force standing at the forefront of the struggle against Western hegemony not by chance but by virtue of its history and cultural and civilizational identity.

After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, relations with the countries of the World Majority have proved to be the most important asset of Russian foreign policy. The existence of an array of countries that are not controlled or not fully controlled by the West makes Russia's isolation impossible and significantly limits the effectiveness of anti-Russian sanctions.

Russia's victory in Ukraine will give an impetus to further efforts to change the global balance of power in favor of mutual respect and equal dialogue, and eventually establish a world order based on cultural and civilizational diversity. A defeat, even conditional, would mean a slowdown or even partial reversal of the emancipation from Western hegemony.

The World Majority is not something external to Russia. Russia itself is its active member, its most important geopolitical resource and, in fact, its military-political core.

Strategically, the World Majority policy is a program to build a new world order. Developing such a program and the related long-term (for example, until 2040) strategy is a priority.


Russia is polyvalent in terms of ability to develop mutual understanding and interaction with a wide range of countries, cultures, and civilizations. It is called upon to generate new ideas and practices of interstate cooperation.

The vanguard of the World Majority is BRICS (Fig. 1) and partly the SCO (Fig. 2) with their potential for making rules, setting standards, conducting policies, and creating institutions alternative to the Western ones.

As a product of its own development, principles, methods and practices of relationships, the World Majority is a preimage or a prototype of the future world, which cannot be universalized by definition. For this reason, leadership within the World Majority cannot imply anyone's dominance, and any ideas within it can only be possible if they have been voluntarily accepted by all interested parties.


Special emphasis in relations with the World Majority states must be placed on the joint creation of cooperation infrastructure as an element of the new world order, and an alternative system of international public goods (primarily in areas such as global finance, trade and investment relations, technological standards, logistics, information resources, energy and food security), as well as on ensuring the maximum sovereignty of the World Majority countries, including by military-political means. The institutional and technological advantage of Western countries will create difficulties, which sets relevant tasks for the World Majority, including Russia, to tackle.

Fig. 1. The Present and Future of BRICS



Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of materials from <https://infobrics.org/>

Fig. 2. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023



Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of materials from <http://rus.sectscsco.org/>

The main functional aspects of the Russian strategy in relation to the World Majority (Fig. 3) are: accelerating efforts to shift the center of Russia's spiritual and material development towards the Urals and the whole of Siberia; developing trade and economic ties with traditional and new partners; implementing joint technological, in particular biotechnological and ICT, projects, including technology platforms; creating new logistic corridors to world markets; ensuring Russia's systemic presence in growing markets (Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America).

Fig. 3. Russia's Strategy for the World Majority



Source: compiled by the authors

A related task is to sharply increase knowledge about the World Majority countries and provide more information about these countries and from these countries to the Russian audience.

Institutional priorities include the World Majority's own organizations in which Western countries are not represented, with an emphasis on the development of BRICS and the SCO, accelerated creation of technology platforms with these countries, and intensive expansion of contacts in the field of education and science.

In terms of values, Russia is focused on helping strengthen state institutions and freeing states from neocolonial dependence; respecting the socio-cultural identity of all countries and peoples; protecting human values consecrated by all world religions, cultures, and civilizations from the Western-promoted anti-human values and ideas of "transhumanism," and upholding diversity, and ideological and ethical pluralism as a matter of principle.

The effectiveness of the system of assistance to foreign states needs to be increased significantly. Instead of providing funding to international organizations where Russian aid is anonymized, it should go directly to the recipients.

Russian foreign policy projects, which have been announced in recent years but so far remain organizationally and conceptually unfinished, need to be specified, clarified and

elaborated further. This concerns primarily the Greater Eurasian Partnership as well as the Persian Gulf security concept.

Since the West continues to step up military support for Kiev and even creates conditions for strikes into Russian territory, it is advisable to prepare the ruling circles and societies of the World Majority countries for a possible conflict escalation, including through political or even – in extreme cases – direct use of the nuclear factor. The very fact of discussing this issue with the political and expert circles in the World Majority countries will become a powerful factor in containing the West and breaking its will to engage in aggressive behavior.

1. Two Spaces of Russian Foreign Policy

1.1. According to the effective Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Russian foreign policy is based on the cultural and civilizational self-determination of Russia as “an original state-civilization, a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power” performing an “historically unique mission to maintain the global balance of power” in the broad sense of this notion.

1.2. Since the start of the SMO in Ukraine, the Russian foreign policy space has split in two. On the one hand, a U.S.-led coalition of several dozen states, which keeps taking new punitive measures against Russia, is seeking to isolate our country politically and economically and is actively involved in a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. This is a real hybrid war unleashed by the West. There has never been a hostile coalition of such size opposing our country in modern history. On the other hand, there is the rest of the world: more than a hundred countries that de facto have taken a neutral position on the Ukraine conflict, and many have assumed a benevolent attitude towards Russia, continuing to trade and maintain various contacts. Refusal to join anti-Russian sanctions is the main criterion in determining that a country is friendly. Inevitably, there will be a certain “gray zone” of states, which depend on the West to varying degrees and which have assumed different positions on the current conflict.

1.3. The fundamental—not only geopolitical and geo-economic, but also value and fully civilizational—nature of the confrontation between Russia and the West means that the conflict will be long. Either Russia defends its right to free and safe development in a world freed from American and Western hegemony, or the United States and its allies will be able to eliminate Russia as an independent and unified country. Normalization of relations with most of the West, even in the medium term, is not only impossible but also unbeneficial, as it will distract attention from restructuring the Russian economy and society in order to be able to live in an unstable world of acute conflicts in the next fifteen to twenty years, and from reorienting the country to new markets. Normalization, when it comes, must be carried out from the standpoint of one of the World Majority’s central powers. We proceed from the unambiguous assumption that the West’s role and position in world geopolitics,

geo-economics, and ideology will decline in waves. The West is a powerful but historically retreating construct.

1.4. Russia's relations with the second group of countries, on the contrary, are on the rise. Trade is growing, more and more contacts are established at various levels, and communication between people is intensifying. Naturally, the conflict in Ukraine has affected relations with this part of the international community. In general, Asian, Middle and Near Eastern, African, and Latin American countries are a territory of peace for us, but it is also a space of geopolitical and other competition with the West, particularly fierce at the current stage of the geopolitical stratification of the world.

1.4.1. It is necessary to distinguish between the elites of specific World Majority countries and their population. Being embedded in the Western coordinate system, their elites are not always ready to make a clear choice. But the movement towards greater independence is obvious, and it needs to be facilitated.

1.4.2. There is an understanding among many World Majority states, including in the public mind, that the confrontation between Russia and the West creates conditions for strengthening the sovereignty and independence of these countries, and expands the room for their foreign policy, cultural, and civilizational maneuvering.

1.4.3. Russia is a force that stands at the forefront of the struggle with the West not by chance, but because of its history and national identity. Therefore Western attacks on Russia are aimed at fighting the emancipation of the World Majority. It is worth emphasizing the continuity of Russia's international positioning, noting, for example, the importance of the Russian Revolution for the "awakening of the East" and the big role the Soviet Union played in the decolonization process.

1.5. The most important task in the foreseeable future is to turn cooperation with the World Majority countries into a reliable and growing resource of our struggle for Russian civilization and the Russian world, for a fair and democratic world order based on the goals and principles of the UN Charter and the entire set of universal international legal instruments. Such interaction, cooperation, and partnership are critical to achieving our strategic goals.

1.6. States that maintain a neutral and/or constructive attitude towards Russia, with rare exceptions, are not our allies. The conflict in Ukraine did not split the world into two camps. The World Majority is not a monolithic entity or bloc. It comprises dozens and hundreds of multicolored communities with distinctive cultures, their own political traditions and different levels of development. Structurally, it consists of states-civilizations, such as China and India, as well as civilizational communities: Arab-Muslim, African, ASEAN, Latin American, the Caribbean. They will play a key role in building a polycentric world order. A sign of the times is centripetal trends in the development of non-Western civilizational communities and regions, as well as the development of inter-civilizational ties. Russia is a friendly partner of all the communities making up the World Majority. Finally, due to its cultural openness, Russia is destined to become a "civilization of civilizations – a universal

Fig. 4. Colonizers Must be Made Accountable!



Source: https://archivogram.top/32861545-plakat_kolonizatorov_-_k_otvetu (Vladimir Volikov)

unifier. This is its advantage and the vital key to the future. The main sources of our development and possibilities to influence the world lie outside the Western world.

1.6.1. The countries in the Global South and East are our natural allies in democratizing the world order, eradicating neocolonial practices, and banning instruments of pressure and blackmail from the international political, monetary and financial systems; they are our partners in adjusting the agenda of international organizations towards recognizing the interests of all nations that are not related to the “golden billion.” Deepening the comprehensive partnership with the World Majority is a long-term strategic task.

1.6.2. These countries and their people share normal human values with us (they are often called conservative). Uniting around these values against the post-human and even anti-human values being imposed by the modern Western elites on their societies and the whole world is an important part of Russian policy towards the World Majority.

1.7. The economic system of the modern world is largely controlled by Western globalists. The West also dominates the world information space. Many of the de facto neutral states vote at the UN General Assembly and other international organizations in support of anti-Russian resolutions written by the Western governments. This is the result of political pressure. A considerable part of the states that have refused to join anti-Russian sanctions are forced to comply with the restrictions imposed by the United States and its allies in order to avoid secondary sanctions against themselves.

1.7.1. Nevertheless, the emergence of a large group of new neutral states (previously neutral European countries have abandoned their neutrality and joined the United States) is an important factor in international development that has come as a shock to the Western elites, indicating that the sphere of the collective West’s influence is shrinking.

1.8. It may seem that such a division of the world – according to the attitude of certain countries towards Russia amid the SMO – is subjective and even accidental. In reality the SMO catalyzed the trends that had already been developing and prompted many countries to take steps towards self-determination amid a geopolitical revolution. The global hegemony of the United States/West, established de facto after the collapse of the Soviet Union, reached its peak at the beginning of the 21st century and started to crumble. Embodying the neo-colonial dependence of the entire non-Western world, it brought global development to a standstill and caused a radical geopolitical transformation.

1.9. The World Majority is not the anti-West, although objectively its interests are at odds with Western interests as they are stated by the present Western elites. The World Majority is important per se, and interaction with it requires using network diplomacy methods and creating open (and variable) ad hoc alliances based on shared interests. This work is becoming a key task for Russian diplomacy, and determines the nature of its resources and personnel policy. The entire diplomatic work will have to be overhauled. The goal of Russia's foreign policy and foreign economic activity is to break the West's will to continue the confrontation and to convince the Western capitals to retreat relatively peacefully. This is also one of the aims of Russia's active and proactive policy towards the World Majority.


1.9.1. The West is still relatively monolithic; its unity is secured both by common vested interests (extracting geopolitical rent) and Washington's disciplining policies. Russia has yet to master new methods of foreign policy work. As our overall influence increases, the World Majority countries can become the most important factor in breaking up the West's unity.

1.10. The institutional and technological advantage of Western countries creates difficulties and sets relevant tasks for the World Majority to tackle. The most important resource and source of the Soviet Union's authority was its technological and economic breakthrough in the first two post-war decades. It will have to be repeated in the new historical conditions, on a new technological basis and in equal partnership with the World Majority countries.

1.11. The leading countries of the non-Western part of the world – China and India – claim to be world powers; a number of regional players – from Turkey and Saudi Arabia to Brazil and Mexico and from Iran to South Africa – have embarked on a path of asserting foreign policy independence and filling the vacuum created by the shrinking U.S./West “strategic oversight.”


1.11.1. There is an objective contradiction between the multipolarity/polycentricity of the emerging world order and the ability to ensure the equality of all states, primarily small ones. To smooth it out, global policy and international development need to be regionalized, with the main activity to be shifted to regional clusters. For the most part, the new world order will “grow” from below, from what is happening at the regional and subregional levels. In this scheme of things, BRICS will create conditions for universal emancipation at the global level, and the SCO will do the same in Greater Eurasia. In addition to the common opposition to the Western hegemony, these organizations will create alternative platforms

Fig. 5. Dynamics and Forecast of Total GDP Growth by PPP at Current Prices of BRICS Members in 2014–2028, USD Trillion



Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of materials from World Economic Outlook database: October 2023

Fig. 6. Dynamics and Forecast of Total GDP Growth by PPP at Current Prices of BRICS and G7 Members in 2014–2028, USD Trillion



Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of materials from World Economic Outlook database: October 2023

and tools, proving their role as providers of “international public goods” without charging the neocolonial rent for them.

1.12. The World Majority countries represent not only the majority of the planet's population; their combined gross domestic product has already exceeded that of the collective West. The five founding BRICS countries alone account for more than two-fifths of the world's population and generate more than a third of the world gross product. BRICS has already outweighed the seven leading Western economies (Fig. 5-6).

1.12.1. One hundred of the largest metropolitan areas and an increasingly growing number of major technology platforms will be located in the World Majority countries. This is not only about a new redistribution of the world economy in favor of resource-producing countries (including the processing of their resources and their use by these countries themselves, for example, by creating energy-intensive industries, which would be appropriate for Russia). Africa is the largest source of global economic growth. This will lay the economic foundation for more harmonious and balanced world development in the long term. Western countries will have to prove their status as a provider of “international public goods.” So far the West is generally losing and has to use force and economic pressure. Depriving the West of the ability to impose its interests by force strengthens the competitive advantages of developing countries, including territorial, resource, and demographic ones. The political role of renewable and non-renewable natural resources will increase.

1.13. Of the nine nuclear-weapon states in the modern world, six – Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the DPRK – are located outside the West. Many World Majority countries have an increasingly strong military. The West's military dominance – the historical basis of its hegemony – is receding into the past, partly due to the collective West's conflict-mongering activities in a number of regions of the non-Western world, but most importantly due to the growing military power of Russia, China, and other World Majority countries.

2. World Majority Phenomenon

2.1. The SMO has become a test for the readiness of countries to develop independently and pursue national interests. In fact, the armed conflict in Ukraine has facilitated the emergence of a new phenomenon – the World Majority striving for political independence or, at least, foreign policy and strategic autonomy from the United States and its allies. So far, this shows in their distancing from the Western agenda, a kind of “civil disobedience” in foreign policy, as well as in attempts to solve the problems of their own development by overcoming neocolonial dependence on former parent states.

2.1.1. The main conflict of the modern world stems from a contradiction between the global hegemony of the U.S./West, which it is trying to defend with a desperate

counterattack, in particular, in Ukraine, and the striving of non-Western countries towards full-fledged sovereignty that is not constrained by Western dogmas, institutions, and rules. These countries, including China, are not interested in a conflict with the West and advocate an evolutionary transformation of Western hegemony as the least costly option. No one wants to face the risk of internal destabilization after global turmoil. Therefore Russia should not give the impression that it is seeking to involve the World Majority countries in the conflict with the West on its side.

2.1.2. There is an opinion that the main contradiction lies between development on the basis of diverse and pluralistic value systems and socio-economic models, on the one hand, and the policy of universalization employed by the U.S./West as a means of ensuring its selfish interests, on the other. Under the system they control, Western elites still continue to provide some international public goods, but the price of using them becomes increasingly unacceptable for the rest.

2.1.3. The rise of the non-Western world also poses a broader question: What makes up the combined power of a state in the current circumstances? The dialectics of various constituent elements of such power is quite complex and needs to be studied separately.

2.2. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, relations with the World Majority countries have proved to be Russia's most important foreign policy asset. The existence of a community of countries that are not controlled or not fully controlled by the West makes Russia's isolation impossible and significantly limits the effectiveness of anti-Russian sanctions. The dollar continues to be the main reserve currency, and the World Majority countries are "bound" by the terms of Western development institutions, but the very prospect of qualitatively new and meaningful relations between Russia and the World Majority states indicates dramatic shifts in the global balance of power and is justifiably perceived by the West as a threat to its hegemony.

2.3. Russia's victory in Ukraine will facilitate further change in the global balance of power in favor of relations based on mutual respect, and a future polycentric world order based on cultural and civilizational diversity. There is an opinion that such a victory could raise concerns in some non-Western countries that international relations are entering the stage of great-power rivalry whereby the sovereignty of other countries, primarily small ones, will be suppressed (this view is voiced in Western discourse). At the same time, we are witnessing a transition to a post-Western world, the structure of which will be determined collectively by all countries in the spirit of the UN Charter and the established universal norms of international law. It is necessary to expose the West's attempts to abandon the post-war world order with the UN's central role by promoting a rules-based order, which is a form of diktat. All participants agreed that the relevant work on our part should be guided by the positive goal of giving all states equal opportunities and space for free development.

2.4. The World Majority is not something external to Russia. Russia itself is its active member and the most important geopolitical and military resource. Russia most clearly

shows commitment to sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, spiritual and cultural identity, as well as the ability to stand up for itself and assist others in upholding the freedom of choice. Russia's task should be to provide an ideological and intellectual foundation for the World Majority. This would be in line with the basic provisions of the updated Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which clearly declares the country's cultural and civilizational self-determination as a new quality of the Russian factor in world politics.

2.5. Russia is polyvalent in terms of ability to develop mutual understanding and interaction with a wide range of countries, cultures, and civilizations. Cultural and civilizational compatibility arising from Russian identity is opposed to the Western worldview and political culture based on coercion, violence, diktat, and control.

2.6. The World Majority is not homogeneous. There are acute contradictions between some of its countries. Suffice it to mention China and India, India and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and others. Therefore, Russia's policy, based on a set of principles, is deliberately variable in practical terms and focused on specific results in each individual case. Examples (in different stages of implementation) are the Astana process for Syria, the Moscow process for Afghanistan, and proposals for a regional security system in the Persian Gulf region between Iran and the GCC.

2.6.1. The fact that the World Majority is not monolithic in the face of the consolidated West can be a problem only in terms of bloc mentality. Its inertia continues to show in different parts of the world but is dwindling (for example, the Pacific bloc AUKUS had to be created solely on an Anglo-Saxon basis). On the contrary, the heterogeneity of the World Majority reflects the natural state of the world with its cultural and civilizational diversity. There can be no vanguard here. Groups of countries with certain overlapping interests, stemming from the level of their development, geography, and cultural and civilizational factors, are united by a common desire for emancipation from Western hegemony that has become a brake on global development.

2.6.2. There are countries like Russia, China (although Beijing is trying to avoid direct confrontation with the United States), Iran, and the DPRK, which are already in a state of conflict with the West. There are those who are friendly towards Russia to varying degrees (this does not prevent some of them, for example Turkey, from supplying weapons to Ukraine) but cannot evade compliance with Western sanctions. There are relatively neutral states that have not joined the sanctions but do not support Russia directly; for example, they walk out during voting on Western resolutions or abstain from voting. There are countries that have not formally imposed sanctions but strictly adhere to them informally. Differences lie on top of the formal factors, be it, for example, our CSTO allies or EAEU partners.

2.6.3. The weakening of the West's global hegemony will facilitate the trend towards regionalization. Regional clusters will subsequently generate a new policy at the global level. This will entail a gradual readjustment of national priorities. For example, Israel is part of American-centric institutions but objectively is closely linked to the Middle East,

that is, the Arab-Islamic world. Japan, South Korea, and Pakistan are likely to get engrossed in their regional systems of relations, as they overcome their international stature imposed from the outside and the impact of cultural and civilizational identity factors grows.

2.6.4. The West's ideological and other dominance over the past centuries has distorted the natural picture of the world, and the development of entire regions and individual countries. The very concept of ideology is a product of Western civilization. What has happened in the last thirty years is an overreach so radical that it does not fit into any common denominator of global development, and, in fact, is rejected by most countries (including even Eastern European ones). In other words, the West is isolating itself, revealing its specificity, which it is entitled to but as a civilization among many others, not as a hegemon.

2.7. The World Majority, some members of which are driven by national interests, should not be likened to the Cold War-era Non-Aligned Movement, which deliberately sought to fence itself off and stay outside the acute military-ideological confrontation between the USSR and the United States. Most countries, on the contrary, seek to play an increasingly significant role in international processes. Apart from the modified Non-Aligned Movement, there is the Group of 77 (at the UN) involving 134 states. They have their own agenda covering a wide range of issues, which is ignored by the West. Russia should provide systemic support to it.

2.8. The vanguard of the World Majority is BRICS and partly the SCO with their potential for making rules, setting standards, conducting policies, and creating institutions for a new era, as well as a number of countries that are most active in seeking emancipation from Western hegemony (Cuba, Venezuela, and others). Unlike the Non-Aligned Movement, these and other formats, including the Group of 77, are not “ballast” intended to keep “the global boat from turning over” but active participants in the struggle for the future world order.

Fig. 7. Joint Photography of the Heads of SCO Member States, Heads of SCO Observer States, Heads of Invited States and Heads of Invited International Organizations



Source: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69361/photos/68960> (Sergey Bobylev, TASS)

2.9. As a result of the crisis in the collective West, some Western countries will start joining the World Majority, where Atlanticist elites will have to cede power to national-oriented forces. This will happen when the conflict between bloc discipline (NATO) and the diktat of supranational bodies (EU), on the one hand, and national interests, on the other, is resolved.

2.10. So the concept of the World Majority is not anti-Western in its essence. This is the idea of liberation from the hegemony of any powers seeking to universalize humanity on the basis of a globalist idea/model. The World Majority is a space that deliberately rejects any universalization and, therefore, any intensions of this kind by anyone (including potential dominant powers, for example, China). As a product of its own development, principles, methods and practices of relationships, the World Majority is a preimage or prototype of the future world, which cannot be universalized by definition.

2.11. The World Majority needs an ideology, but the very notion of ideology is a specific product of Western civilization. The World Majority should be guided by real development needs that match the cultural and civilizational identity of its countries and their associations. There is no need to set the task of developing an ideology, but there can be a common narrative incorporating the overlapping paradigms of different cultures.

2.12. The regulatory and practical organization of the World Majority will be determined through network diplomacy and open (and variable) ad hoc alliances acting by consensus or through groups of interested countries.

2.13. “The extremist mutation” of the liberal idea currently underway in the West should be classified as a specific product of Western civilization not subject to internationalization. There is a need for our own response – agreeable with the cultural and philosophical traditions of different civilizations – to the most acute challenges to human development ranging from environmental issues to ethical problems related to modern technologies. Blindly following the Western agenda is not just useless but is also harmful.

3. Basic Principles of Russia's Approach Towards the World Majority

3.1. Russia is part of the World Majority, a civilizational and cultural community that objectively opposes the universalist and globalist West striving by all means to extend its hegemony. The Russian approach suggests joint work with the World Majority countries to build a new infrastructure of the world order. Control over it will be distributed between states and their associations, infrastructure, transport, and logistics hubs, exchanges, and certification and standardization centers, and will not be in the hands of one power, its client states and institutions, as is now the case.

Fig. 8. Vladivostok Commercial Sea Port



Source: <https://www.vmtp.ru/press-tsentr/novosti/po-itogam-2022-goda-vmtp-snova-stal-liderom-rossii-po-kontejnerooborotu>

3.1.1. Such geopolitical transformation may take 10-15 years. It will accelerate as a critical mass of institutional and other changes builds up.

3.2. Asian, Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American countries will be an unconditional priority of Russia's policy in the foreseeable future.

3.3. Russia should actively, including publicly, support forces advocating policies based on the national interests and values in Europe, Japan, other states allied with the U.S., and in the United States itself. The rise of such forces to power will help normalize the situation in Europe and the Anglosphere as two separate, albeit related, civilizations, and facilitate the political emancipation of Japan and South Korea. At the same time, the current crisis can propel radical nationalist and aggressive groups to success in a number of Western countries, which will require active deterrent measures from Russia.

3.4. Special emphasis in relations with the World Majority states should be placed on joint efforts to build an alternative system for providing international public goods (primarily in areas such as world finance, trade, investment, technological standards, logistics, information resources, energy and food security).

3.5. It must be emphasized that the new world order that we intend to build is not the next edition of the “concert of nations” (“oligarchy instead of monarchy”) but a polycentric model, where multilateral interaction between sovereign states and civilizational platforms excludes anyone’s hegemony.

3.5.1. It will be a world order based on international law and the reaffirmed commitment of states participating in international relations to the principles of the UN Charter, the main of which is the sovereign equality of states.

3.5.2. A significant part of the elites in non-Western countries (including China) is still inclined to believe that Western hegemony can smoothly evolve into something collective. Public awareness efforts need to be taken to explain that modern Western elites are intrinsically unable to give up their hegemony that has become their mode of existence. As long as the West remains aggressively defensive, it will not be ready to reconsider its policy. It is in the interests of the World Majority to build broad multifaceted autonomy from the West and its institutions by creating alternative platforms and multilateral formats of cooperation and practices. Otherwise, our countries will also have to bear the cost of the coming collapse of Western hegemony. We must be prepared that the creation of a new infrastructure of the world order will be accompanied not only by active resistance from the retreating hegemon, but also by growing transaction costs and increased volatility.

3.6. Russia’s intellectual and practical leadership in the institutions being created by the World Majority countries needs support.

3.7. It is necessary to initiate the fight against Western technological protectionism and step up measures to avoid the monopoly of the dollar.


3.8. Development is an imperative and an absolute priority for our partners in the World Majority. Therefore Western countries will try to influence the policies of the World Majority countries by restricting or, conversely, giving them access to markets, technologies. For cooperation with partners to be successful, we must clearly understand their interests, problems and aspirations. We should deepen and expand our knowledge of the countries and regions of the World Majority, including through intensive development of Oriental, African, Latin American, and Caribbean studies.

4. Key Functional Aspects of Russia’s Strategy Towards the World Majority

4.1. Accelerating the development of Russian regions – the Urals and all of Siberia – that border on Asian countries.

4.2. Implementing joint technological, in particular biotechnological and ICT, projects, including in the format of technology platforms. Interacting with the most technologically

Fig. 9. Taigishonk Valley Morning



Source: <https://rgo.ru/activity/redaction/photo/utro-doliny-taygishonka/> (Sergey Mezhin, RGO)

advanced World Majority countries to accelerate domestic scientific and technical development, making a technological breakthrough, and getting access to more markets for Russian technology-intensive products.

4.3. Creating new logistic corridors to world markets by developing meridional ties in order to compensate for the logistic blockade in the west. These are the North-South Corridor connecting Russia with Iran, India, Pakistan, the Middle and Near East, and Africa, as well as sea routes around Eurasia: a semicircle from Murmansk to Mumbai, of which the Northern Sea Route is part; but also in the east and south through Mongolia and by pairing with China's Belt and Road Initiative.

4.4. Ensuring our systemic presence in new growing markets (Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America).

4.5. Promoting the creation of new international commodity exchanges (metals, grain, gold, diamonds, etc.) independent of the Anglo-American ones.

4.6. Presenting the Russian vision of UN reform that would imply the expansion of the Security Council to include India, Brazil, representatives of the Arab-Islamic world and Africa as full permanent members, while Germany and Japan cannot claim a special role since they are not completely sovereign and are under foreign occupation. Some panelists suggested introducing rotating semi-permanent membership for 12 regional powers (to reflect the civilizational structure of the world) and raising the question of excessive representation of Western civilization, namely its Anglo-Saxon segment and the European Union. This inclusive vision, based on the civilizational model of international relations,

must be promoted through diplomatic contacts with the World Majority countries and publicly as the only means of ensuring the effectiveness of the UN and its role as the central coordinating body of the international community at the current critical stage.

4.7. Promoting the initiative to move the UN headquarters and UN offices from the United States and Europe to other regions (for example, Dubai, Istanbul, Cairo, Addis Ababa, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Shanghai, or Samarkand).

4.8. Helping partner countries strengthen national security.

4.9. Stating and promoting Russian ideas, worked out jointly with like-minded states, in such areas as assistance to developing countries, environmental protection (not only and not so much fighting climate change), global food security, and others.

4.10. Establishing and reinforcing a balanced approach to issues currently covered by the Western ESG concept (Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance), the climate agenda, and intellectual property issues. Joint action to propose a new nature saving policy would be of paramount importance as an alternative to the West's green agenda aimed at preserving the benefits of the "golden billion."

4.11. Coordinating the positions of the World Majority countries on the regulation of the Internet and social networks, fighting censorship practices used by the largest Western technology companies, eliminating digital inequality, and ensuring information sovereignty.

4.12. Promoting regional security through diplomatic initiatives (for example, in the Transcaucasia, the Persian Gulf region, Central Asia), military operations, as in Syria, through the Russian military presence, both permanent and temporary, in a number of regions of the world.

Fig. 10. During a Visit to the Hmeymim Airbase



Source: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56351/photos/51676>

4.13. Advancing – together with other interested countries – the idea that the freezing of the national gold and foreign exchange reserves is inadmissible, and creating an “anti-sanctions club” of states for joint protection of interests from the West’s encroachment.

4.14. Creating own rating agencies together with the BRICS and SCO countries.

4.15. Taking active steps to enter the education markets of Asia, Africa, and Latin America by increasing the number of foreign branches of leading Russian universities; expanding training programs in Russian universities for specialists from the World Majority countries; creating network universities within BRICS.

4.16. Using Russian potential for combating infections and developing vaccines, creating necessary platforms with interested World Majority countries.

4.17. Creating an international information and multimedia consortium with a joint editorial board, involving the leading globally-oriented BRICS and SCO media and headquartered in one of these countries.

4.18. Conducting active public diplomacy through civil society institutions, political science centers and mass media, making it systemic and properly funded, including through public-private partnership. In general, it is necessary to dramatically increase contacts between people, including through tourism, cultural ties, and exchanges.

5. Priorities: the Institutional Aspect

5.1. These include own organizations of the World Majority countries that do not involve Western representatives. The main institution-building guidelines are listed below.

5.2. The development of BRICS by open architecture principles as a world-level institution for setting a political and economic agenda and coordinating the efforts of the leading World Majority countries on important issues. This is essentially a prototype for an organization of the new world order: developing and implementing a concept of currency or other payment instrument of the BRICS countries (“new Bretton Woods”) and giving BRICS regulatory functions, for example, on matters of standardization, certification of vaccines, regulation of cybersecurity standards (“BRICS tomorrow is the UN the day after tomorrow”).

5.2.1. In the absence of consensus on the institutionalization of BRICS in the near future, emphasis should be placed on the comprehensive development of BRICS+ formats, including BRICS+SCO, BRICS+EAEU, BRICS+Mercosur, BRICS+African Union, BRICS+ASEAN, as BRICS partners come up with pertinent initiatives and relevant structures get ready for cooperation.

5.3. The idea of creating a “Group of 77+Russia” format should be considered (China has a similar format).

5.4. Expanding and improving the efficiency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), including as a Eurasian sub-region in the BRICS system; turning the SCO space into a Greater Eurasian Security and Development Community.

5.4.1. Comprehensive development of SCO+ formats, including interaction with ASEAN, the GCC, the RCEP, and the AIIB.

5.4.2. The largest civilizations – Indian, Islamic, Chinese, Russian, Central Asian, etc. – should become the assembly point for a new model of international security and cooperation in the vast continent. The most important task of the SCO, along with the creation of a security and development community, is to increase the internal connectivity of Greater Eurasia, which is overly dependent on sea routes. Finally, there is a task of great importance – developing cultural, scientific, technical, and humanitarian exchanges between the peoples of the continent, who communicate more often with and through distant partners than with immediate neighbors (“The SCO stands for a safe and prosperous Eurasia”).

5.5. Interaction within OPEC+ and with gas-exporting countries in their interests and in the interests of other World Majority countries to ensure stability in the energy markets (“OPEC+ and GECF=global energy stability”).

5.6. Stepping up the work of the Russia-India-China triangle as a forum for interaction and smoothing contradictions between the two leading strategic partners of Russia – India and China.

5.7. Increasing Russia's role in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the largest forum of Muslim states.

5.8. More active interaction with the World Majority countries within the framework of international forums such as the UN; the G20 (half of whose members represent the World Majority); and a number of UN specialized bodies, including the WHO, UNESCO, etc., paying special attention to their reform in accordance with the aspirations of the World Majority countries.

6. Russian Policy: the Value Aspect

6.1. Promoting the strengthening of state institutions and the liberation of countries from neocolonial dependence (Russia has an advantage in this respect as a power that did not have overseas colonies) that deprives the World Majority countries of freedom of maneuver and room for their own development. The system of Western dominance is in crisis and can no longer provide “international public goods,” and the Western development model has exhausted itself (which is one of the key reasons for the global development crisis).

6.2. Respect for the socio-cultural identity of all countries and peoples (Russia is an

example of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between many ethnic groups, cultures, and religions within its own civilization).

6.3. Protection of human values consecrated by all world religions, cultures and civilizations from the anti-human ideas of “transhumanism” advanced by the West.

6.4. Respect for the sovereignty of states and their national interests (Russia’s foreign policy task is to harmonize the interests of the parties).

6.5. Right to development.

6.6. Equality of states.

6.7. Justice.

6.8. Solidarity and mutual assistance.

6.9. Respect for the traditions of peoples as the basis for the internal development of states.

6.10. Mutual benefit.

6.11. Openness.

6.12. Religious tolerance and respect.

6.13. Priority of collective values over individual ones.

7. Crucial Aspects of the New Policy With Regard to Some Regions of the World Majority

7.1. The fact that politically Russia is part of the World Majority does not mean that it is comprised in the Global South or is its full part. In geographical, geoeconomic, geocultural, climatic and other senses, Russia remains a northern country. The problems of climate change, demography (including population migration), food, debt, and natural resources are seen in Russia differently than in many World Majority countries. Where interests overlap, interaction and ad hoc alliances are needed; where they diverge or even collide, contradictions must be managed. We can be a source of solutions to problems facing some of the World Majority countries, for example, by acting as a guarantor of food, energy, information, military and other types of security.

7.1.1. The fact that Russia belongs in the Arctic region makes the Arctic a powerful resource for interaction with interested countries of the World Majority. In the future, this fact may encourage such countries of the collective West as Japan and South Korea to develop cooperation, and even more so Arctic Council member states that will not survive the transformation of the Arctic into an arena of confrontation.

7.2. In principle, Russia does not have and is unlikely to have permanent allies, with the exception of Belarus within the framework of the Union State. Relations with the countries

Fig. 11. The Beginning of Winter in the Arctic Circle



Source: <https://rgo.ru/activity/redaction/photo/nachalo-zimy-v-zapolyare/> (Andrey Grachev, RGO)

of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are, in fact, a partnership without firm political or military commitments. The same applies to the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Making Russia's policy in the former Soviet space more effective should be the subject of a separate study. We will just say that Moscow should work in the immediate surroundings much more actively and flexibly, interacting with a wider range of counterparties at the country and intra-country levels, including those who are in conflict with each other. Outside the CSTO/EAEU, two countries are of particular importance: Uzbekistan as the largest country in Central Asia and Azerbaijan as an immediate neighbor and part of the North-South Corridor.

7.3. Russia has a unique strategic partnership with China, which, unlike formally allied relations, excludes hierarchy and firm commitments. In the modern context, China and Russia are the most important geopolitical, geo-economic and military-strategic resource for each other. (Fig. 13). Further rapprochement with China is necessitated not only by the internal needs of the two countries, but also by the dynamics of Russian-American and Sino-American relations. At the same time, it should not depend on them. The U.S. hopes to defeat both opponents one by one, avoiding a "two-front war"; it is in the interests

Fig. 12. Plenary Session of the Eurasian Economic Forum



Source: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71198/photos/71200> (Grigoriy Sysoev, RIA Novosti)

of Russia and China to prevent the implementation of Washington's strategic plans by forcing it and the West as a whole to confront the two great powers at once. This scenario is obviously unaffordable for the United States and unacceptable for its European allies. It is necessary to maintain a close relationship between Moscow and Beijing, primarily trade and economic, but also in the field of high technologies, closely coordinating efforts in many areas. China, however, will continue to play by the existing rules for the time being in order to buy time to continue the internal restructuring currently underway.

7.3.1. Beijing is buying time by not allowing its international isolation, while Washington's resources and arm-twisting potential are dwindling. The strengthening of China's position in its confrontation with the United States is in the interests of Russia.

7.3.2. Russia and China do not have completely identical approaches towards changing the existing world order. China is deeply embedded in the globalization processes and striving, at least in the medium term, to transform the existing order smoothly instead of replacing it. The reasons for that are quite understandable: social and domestic political stability in China depends on access to the U.S. and EU markets; China lacks self-sufficiency in foods. Nevertheless, Russia and China have very wide possibilities for interaction on international problems. As the confrontation between China and America deepens, Chinese approaches will gravitate towards the Russian ones.

7.3.3. Russian experts and politicians should study Beijing's global vision of the world


more closely. This will help avoid possible misunderstandings, including public ones, and also facilitate joint relations with other World Majority countries.

7.3.4. There are concerns that once China has achieved strategic self-sufficiency, it may partially lose interest in relations with Russia in the long term. Therefore Russia needs to diversify ties with the World Majority countries and eventually normalize relations on the western flank to the extent possible. The sooner we force the United States (including using the nuclear factor) to look for ways to normalize relations, the better. But this will not happen any time soon.

7.4. In the new conditions, strategic relations with India are extremely important for Russia; ideally, Russian-Indian ties should be brought closer to the level of Russian-Chinese relations (Fig. 13). This is a serious challenge, given the extremely difficult relations between these two countries. It is in our interest to help reduce tension between New Delhi and Beijing. Russia should pay primary attention to India in order to determine reserves for boosting economic relations, technological cooperation and other elements of interaction. Russia needs strategic dialogue with New Delhi and particularly its own Eurasian maritime concept that would cover the North, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

7.4.1. There is an opinion that Russia should not strongly oppose the concept of the Indo-Pacific community, because this concept does not threaten Russian interests. In fact, Russia's negative rhetoric causes a very painful reaction in India.

Fig. 13. Dynamics of Changes in Russian-Chinese and Russian-Indian Trade Turnover in 2014–2022, USD Billion



Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of materials from Trade Map

7.5. In Asia, positive interaction with neighboring countries – Turkey and Iran – is fundamentally important.

7.5.1. Turkey is a NATO member and an important regional ally of the United States. But it pursues an independent policy that creates political, economic, and military opportunities for Russia. At the same time, Turkey is a geopolitical competitor of Russia in a number of regions. It is in Russia's interests to support Turkey's independent foreign policy, tactfully managing contradictions in areas that are sensitive for Russia. While maintaining a generally positive balance of relations with Turkey, Russia should try to ensure that it does not depend on leadership reshuffles in Turkey. To this end, Russia should establish a working relationship with all significant groups within the Turkish elites and develop knowledge about Turkey.

7.5.2. Unlike Turkey, Iran is not an ally but an opponent of the United States, an object of Western sanctions. Russian-Iranian cooperation, including military-technical, has strengthened since the start of the SMO. Iran's importance for Russia is also growing due to changes in supply chains that connect Russia with the outside world. The development of the North-South Corridor passing through Iran has become a priority. Iran has joined the SCO, making it stronger, and it has also received an invitation to join BRICS. Negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, conducted with the participation of Russia, were interrupted because of the U.S. position. Some participants in the situational analysis expressed the opinion, supported by a number of experts, that following the West on the Iranian nuclear program had been counterproductive. At the previous situational analysis devoted to nuclear deterrence, Russian policy had been assessed even more critically. It would be prudent to develop Russian-Iranian strategic dialogue at various levels (as well as in a trilateral format with China), including on countersanctions. In any case, Iranian studies need to be developed rapidly, especially since Iran is not an easy interlocutor and has a number of complaints about Russia's policy both in the past and at present.

7.6. Among other important players in the Middle and Near East and North Africa, we note Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, and Pakistan. Relations with all these countries require a careful individual approach, taking into account, among other things, their relations with each other. The Gulf countries are an important potential source of investment in the Russian economy, and they are our OPEC+ and GECF partners. These states are suspicious of Iran and the Russian-Iranian rapprochement. It would be advisable to step up work on the concept of regional security in the Gulf region. Considering the positive role China played in unblocking Saudi-Iranian relations, it would be advisable to act on this track together with Beijing.

7.6.1. Syria is Russia's stronghold in the heart of the Middle East, which must be held and strengthened. As part of the Syrian settlement, Russia closely interacts with Damascus, Ankara, and Tehran, and also has influence with Israel, using some opportunities for interaction with it that still remain open. Russia should further strengthen economic, political, and military ties with Egypt and create strongholds in the Red Sea region

to enable the Russian Navy to sail from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. More attention should obviously be paid to Pakistan, a nuclear power and Afghanistan's neighbor. The development of relations with Islamabad, however, should not harm Moscow's relations with New Delhi.

Fig. 14. The Multicolored Sahara



Source: https://rgo.ru/activity/redaction/news/vystavka-vladimira-galkina-raznotsvetnaya-sakhara/?sphrase_id=238937 (Vladimir Galkin, RGO)

7.7. In Southeast Asia, priorities are Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The Russia-ASEAN dialogue is also important, including formats where ASEAN plays a major role (RCEP). We have to clarify the functional aspect of the RCEP for ourselves, including in terms of tariff consequences for Russian exporters and the unity of ASEAN itself. For example, we could initiate negotiations with the RCEP through the EAEU. They would fit well into the concept of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. As the contradictions between Beijing and Washington deepen, ASEAN may view Russia as an alternative to the tough choice between the United States and China, for which Moscow should be ready and prepare interesting proposals. For example, technological capabilities are our strong point.

7.8. In Northeast Asia, neighboring states – the DPRK and Mongolia – are of particular interest. On the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Russia should act, by mutual understanding with China, as an attentive observer, following the de facto failure of the American plans for the “denuclearization” of the DPRK. The Republic of Korea’s desire to acquire nuclear

weapons is unlikely to be equivalent to strategic autonomy from the United States, although objectively it will lead to nuclear multipolarity and will create problems for Washington in terms of managing the situation in the region. Korean nationalism on both sides of the 38th parallel can be played out in different ways, including against our interests. Unfortunately, Japanese nationalism has so far not led to any attempts by Tokyo to put an end to its absolute subordination to Washington.

7.9. Russia should step up interaction with Africa, which has rich resources and huge economic growth potential. Russia has laid the groundwork for future work in some African countries, including Nigeria and Tanzania, and it can serve as a basis for expanding existing and building new relations. In the north of Africa, priority is Egypt and Algeria, in the south it is South Africa, a BRICS member and the region's largest economy, as well as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Guinea. In the center and in the west of the continent, Russia can rely on its positions in the Central African Republic, Senegal, and Mali, in the east, on Ethiopia and Eritrea. Attention should be paid to the Democratic Republic of the Congo with its central position in the continent and rich natural resources, and to the need to stabilize the situation in the country. Intensive economic diplomacy, close interaction between the Russian embassies and business, as well as the active promotion of security, media, and information services are required. Russian activity in Africa should be focused on ensuring a systemic presence in the continent, and on strengthening African unity and integration in order to make Africa a member of a polycentric world and the World Majority. In this regard, it is necessary to study the ideas of pan-Africanism and their development at the modern stage. Further institutionalization of the Russia-Africa forum is needed.

Fig. 15. Joint Photography of Delegation Heads Participating in the Second Russia – Africa Summit



Source: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71826/photos/72081> (Sergey Bobylev, TASS)

7.10. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Russia has several anchor points. These are, first of all, states that are close to Russia politically: Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela; a regional giant and BRICS member – Brazil, other major countries such as Argentina and Mexico. Emphasis in relations must be placed on the development of economic ties, but information interaction is no less important; it can range from dialogues at various levels and promoting narratives on global issues to developing common positions on how to build a new world order. Under certain conditions, some Latin American countries may be regarded, with the consent of their governments, as territories that can be used by the Russian Armed Forces.

7.11. In all regions, Russia should establish substantive contacts and cooperation with existing regional bodies, including integration ones, preferably those where the United States does not participate (Washington may also be forced to deny us such cooperation, which would not be a bad option).

7.12. Let us say this again: Russia's current country and regional policy needs to be studied separately.

8. Practical Steps: Broad Maneuver with Resources

8.1. In strategic terms, the policy towards the World Majority is primarily a program for building a new world order. Some of its aspects are outlined in this report. The development of such a program and the associated long-term (for example, until 2040) strategy is a priority task that requires combining the intellectual capabilities and experience of the state and of different segments of society: thinkers, experts, and practitioners in various fields.

8.1.1. These efforts will involve foreign policy and foreign economic aspects of a more significant turn towards not only determining the country's new foreign policy priorities but also acquiring integrated national identity that would reflect domestic traditions and future development challenges.

8.2. The heterogeneity of the World Majority makes detailed universal recommendations impractical: each country needs an individual approach. In general, there is a need for a broad personnel and resource maneuver. This maneuver, rooted in the internal transformation of the country, should be accompanied by the creation of a special group – for example, within the Russian Security Council or the Presidential Administration – to coordinate and oversee all work to redirect foreign policy efforts. The Foreign Ministry alone, with long-established practices and approaches, will not be able to cope with this task. There is no hope for any improvement of relations with the West in the foreseeable future; new, suitable ties can only be built as a result of Russia's victory in the ongoing hybrid war (including the armed conflict in Ukraine). Until then, resources should be diverted to the western track solely for the confrontation with the United States and its

allies (examples include launching a sanctions boomerang, facilitating the self-isolation of the West and Western elites, making use of the contradictions arising in the Western bloc).

8.3. Russia should qualitatively strengthen multidisciplinary think tanks that examine problems in Asian, the Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American countries, and propose working recommendations for Russian policy (there are enough such centers for North America and Europe, although they are in dire need of restructuring and upgrading). The work of existing institutions should be as close as possible to the needs of practical policy. To this end, the degree of interaction between analysts and practitioners should be increased significantly up to mandatory personnel rotation between institutions and relevant departments and companies. Allocated resources should allow these centers to establish close ties with the expert community in the World Majority countries and give them an adequate presence in the media and information space in order to effectively compete with Western commentators.

8.3.1. It is necessary to consider the possibility of redirecting funding intended for Russian Science Foundation internships to applicants from the World Majority countries.

8.4. Russia should drastically increase the number of diplomatic, consular and other officers working in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for the Russian Foreign Ministry and other governmental organizations. The prestige of their work must be raised substantially, including through financial incentives and career prospects. Needless to say, quantitative strengthening of Russian missions abroad would make sense only if the results of their work improve accordingly. Its quality, in turn, depends on profound knowledge of the respective countries, which requires proper training in languages and regional studies. The knowledge of English and Russian (in the CIS countries) is not enough. Mass retraining of personnel can be organized at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, MGIMO, and the Higher School of Economics.

8.5. In order to make our policy towards the World Majority more effective, we should create platforms for closed and more open communication between leading members of the political, economic, business, intellectual elites of Russia and these countries, similarly to the Valdai Club but with a significantly higher status of foreign participants and politically oriented objectives (analogues but not examples are the Bilderberg Club, the Trilateral Commission, the Shangri-La Dialogue, and the Munich Security Conference). For example, Russia could create a BRICS Program Commission as a center generating ideas for the further development and institutional design of BRICS; a RIC club for deeper and substantive communication with the elites of crucial strategic partner states and for closer coordination between the three great powers at the continental and international levels; a Eurasian Club involving more countries (also at a high level) and acting in line with the ideas of the Greater Eurasian Partnership.

8.5.1. Novosibirsk, Tyumen, Tomsk, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Vladivostok should be positioned as venues for the World Majority conferences. Without seeking any exclusivity so as not to unnecessarily compete with Beijing or New Delhi, we

could outline areas where we are ready to provide intellectual leadership, for example, international and regional security, energy, environmental conservation. The purpose of all efforts is to provide broad and sustainable support for the construction of a new world order, with maximum regard for the Russian interests.

Fig. 16. The Prime Minister of Vietnam Phạm Minh Chính Addressed the Participants of the Eastern Economic Forum by Video Message



Source: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69299/photos/68839> (Stansislav Krasilnikov, photohost agency TASS)

8.6. The effectiveness of the system of assistance to foreign states needs to be increased significantly. Instead of providing funding to international organizations where Russian aid is anonymized, it should go directly to the recipients and get extensive coverage in the local mass media.

8.6.1. All our efforts to fit into the Western format (announced in the UN) of international development assistance (IDA) have failed. We are uncompetitive in this area, long controlled by the West (donations to the IDA recipient countries), and we have not created our own effective mechanisms for providing financial and economic assistance to developing countries. The panelists suggested reviving relevant Soviet practices in order to take our relations with the World Majority countries in the field of development out

of Western-controlled institutions. This is an extremely important and urgent question, and we will have to start almost from square one. It will be best if such a body is supra-departmental, and its project financing expertise includes feasibility studies by state-owned corporations and private business.

It was pointed out quite strongly that the current system of managing aid programs is inadequate even after its withdrawal from under the control of the Finance Ministry. It is necessary either to create a separate body or hand over the relevant functions to Rosstrudnichestvo.

8.6.2. It was suggested that differentiated prices should be used for certain commodities supplied to various groups of countries so as to offer price preferences to some countries of the World Majority (and benefits to relevant Russian operators).

8.6.3. Some panelists spoke about the need for a special government program offering comprehensive solutions regarding foreign economic activity with the World Majority: development of infrastructure and logistics, the shortage of trained personnel, underdeveloped network of trade agreements, lack of information and access to the markets of these countries, which often have high barriers to foreign business. In general, this means qualitatively new work to create a critical infrastructure for foreign economic activity with an emphasis on solving logistics problems, creating production and marketing hubs, and interacting in the production of high-tech equipment and components. In parallel, work has to be stepped up to build a bilateral and multilateral financial architecture, including settlements in digital national currency.

8.7. It is time for Russia to expand its representation and activity in non-Western international organizations, while reducing its representation in organizations whose membership brings no benefits. The former include organizations such as BRICS, the SCO, and a number of others, plus permanently operating forums such as Russia-Africa, Russia-Arab World, Russia-ASEAN, which can serve as the basis for building a new world order. Given the current situation in the UN and the OSCE, where constructive interaction between states is blocked, it would be prudent to partially redirect the work on the global agenda (as well as relevant resources) to the BRICS level, and the continental agenda to the SCO, especially since in the current geopolitical context it would be more appropriate to regard European security as a regional dimension of Eurasian security. Experts said that diplomatic resources were being used irrationally. Therefore Russia's representation in the OSCE must finally be reduced to a symbolic minimum.

8.8. It is necessary to specify, clarify and further develop the Russian foreign policy projects announced in recent years, which have yet to be elaborated both organizationally and conceptually. These include primarily the Greater Eurasian Partnership and a concept of security for the Gulf region. The Greater Eurasian Partnership, which is mainly continental in nature, needs to be supplemented with a maritime component that could be paired with the Indo-Pacific dimension (as interpreted by India) in much the same way we pair the Eurasian Economic Union with China's Belts and Road Initiative. What is important is that

the abovementioned idea and concept should be implemented through specific projects and regular events.

8.9. In terms of foreign policy information and propaganda, Russia needs to make a U-turn towards Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, which will be a target audience for Russia in the foreseeable future. Russia should beef up its media resources targeting the international audience, including RT and Sputnik, work closely with the media, opinion leaders, and social networks in the World Majority countries, and implement joint projects with them. The second area of work is providing much more information to the Russian audience about non-Western countries, their interests and problems, as well as the opportunities that cooperation with them opens up for Russia. To this end, Russia should develop and strategically build a network of correspondents working for the leading Russian media in the World Majority countries and present its own picture of the world that is not influenced by Western narratives. At the same time, partners in the World Majority countries should be encouraged to expand the presence of their media in Russia so that their audiences receive information first-hand, not through Western news agencies and TV channels.

8.10. Russia should stop using the term 'soft power,' which has been borrowed from Western political discourse and reflects the approach and interests of the United States in the first place. We should be talking about our inherent competitive advantages, including the ability to be a "provider" of military and food security, as well as health services. An important point is that the presence of Russia as an important factor in international relations offers a political and economic alternative similar to the one that disappeared after the collapse of the USSR, giving way to hegemony and leaving the World Majority countries with no choice.

8.10.1. An important resource of our work with public opinion in the World Majority countries, especially in the CIS, is Russian international NGOs, public diplomacy bodies and expert dialogues, all of which need greater support from the state and interested charitable foundations, including private business. The purpose is not so much to inform the relevant audiences about Russia's policy and establish contact with certain groups as to maintain constant ties in order to change the attitude of the elites and the public towards Russia and its policy.

8.11. The information confrontation with the collective West makes it necessary to pool the resources of the leading World Majority countries in order to promote other narratives and vision for the future world. In addition to an information multimedia consortium involving the leading BRICS and SCO media, it is necessary to develop national broadcasting services (in the modern sense of the word) in foreign languages, including the languages of Asian and African countries.

8.12. Russian secondary and higher education courses in world history, literature, philosophy, and geography, which have historically been Eurocentric, need to be corrected. Young people should learn more about the historical, cultural, and intellectual heritage

of civilizations in China, India, the Arab East, Turkey, Iran, Central and Southeast Asia, the Far East, as well as Africa and Latin America. The Moscow International Film Festival should give more prominence to non-Western countries and make them more attractive for filmmakers. Along with English, which has become a global means of communication, it is necessary to drastically expand the teaching of languages spoken in Asia and Africa, and start teaching the most common of them (Chinese, Arabic, etc.) at school.

8.12.1. It is necessary to actively popularize the cultural products of the World Majority countries, including through film and television festivals, and exchange exhibitions. These countries produce enough high-quality works of mass art, and our television and film industry could gradually increase the share of products from the World Majority countries by reducing the share of American content.

8.13. The teaching of history, especially national, and the very approach to history need to be revised most radically – in accordance with Paragraph 44 of the Foreign Policy Concept – projecting it outward, including to the World Majority countries.

8.14. To strengthen Russian influence in the World Majority countries, training programs for foreign and graduate students in Russian universities need to be expanded (with the provision of full scholarships so as to compete with Western countries); it is also necessary to increase the number of special university programs for promising young people from all over the world – politicians, journalists, social activists, scientists, (several dozen master's programs in leading universities).

8.14.1. Bilateral or multilateral agreements on the mutual recognition of diplomas and standards, and promotion of business trips (if necessary, unilaterally) would have a positive effect on our work with the World Majority.

8.14.2. It is critical to develop scientific cooperation, including joint research and projects in promising areas such as artificial intelligence and ICT. This would give talented scientists from the World Majority countries, including those who studied or are studying in Russian universities, academic career opportunities as an alternative to Western proposals. We and our partners would share the success and pride.

8.15. The most important resource for working with the World Majority countries is Russian culture and the export of cultural products. This will also require government funding/subsidies, but it will more than pay off by forging a positive attitude towards Russia in the respective countries, as well as by expanding the market.

8.16. The introduction of a visa-free travel regime with the leading countries of the World Majority would produce a great effect.

8.17. Restoring/launching regular air service with the World Majority countries would improve the attitude towards Russia in these countries (not to mention broader contacts between people).

8.18. As Russian athletes continue to be discriminated against by international sports organizations under the influence of Western countries, it would be advisable to organize

international worldwide sports competitions under the BRICS or SCO auspices not only as a modern analogue of the 1980s Goodwill Games but also as an alternative to the commercialized and increasingly ideologized and politicized Olympic movement. Other possible formats include open Russian championships in various sports involving athletes from all over the world. Their television broadcasts could be the starting point for building the abovementioned media consortium of the World Majority countries.

Fig. 17. Participants of the BRICS Leaders' Meeting



Source: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62045/photos/62014>

Appendix 1

List of Participants in the Preliminary Conference “Russia’s Policy Towards the World Majority” March 31, 2023

1. **Sergei A. KARAGANOV**
Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy;
Academic Supervisor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National
Research University–Higher School of Economics
2. **Dmitry V. ALUSHKIN**
Second Secretary, Department of Foreign Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation
3. **Timofei V. BORDACHEV**
Academic Supervisor, Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies,
National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Member of the Council
on Foreign and Defense Policy
4. **Ivan V. DANILIN**
Head of the Department of Science and Innovation and Head of the Innovation
Policy Sector, Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian
Academy of Sciences
5. **Alexei Yu. DROBININ**
Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense
Policy
6. **Alexander M. KRAMARENKO**
Director, Institute of Actual International Problems, Diplomatic Academy of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Member of the Council on
Foreign and Defense Policy
7. **Marsel R. SALIKHOV**
Director of the Center for Economic Expert Analysis, Institute for Public
Administration and Governance, National Research University–Higher School of
Economics
8. **Prokhor Yu. TEBIN**
Head of the Sector of International Military-Political and Military-Economic
Problems; Center for Economic Expertise, Institute for Public Administration and
Governance, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

9. Dmitry V. TRENIN

Research Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

10. Igor N. YERMAKOV

11. Alexander A. ZAITSEV

Associate Professor, Department of World Economy, National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Deputy Head of the Sector of International Economic Research, Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

Academic and Administrative Support

1. Daniil B. MAKUKHIN

Research Assistant, Center for Economic Expertise, Institute for Public Administration and Governance, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

2. Egor N. RYZHKIN

Research Assistant, Center for Economic Expertise, Institute for Public Administration and Governance, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

3. Dmitry A. TSYVAREV

Assistant to Academic Supervisor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

4. Alexandra D. YANKOVA

Research Assistant, Center for Economic Expertise, Institute for Public Administration and Governance, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

Appendix 2

List of Participants in the Situational Analysis Session “Russia’s Policy Towards the World Majority” June 6, 2023

1. Denis V. AGAFONOV

Deputy Head of the Presidential Foreign Policy Directorate

2. Sergei I. AVAKYANTS

Admiral, Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

-
- 3. Kirill V. BABAYEV**
Director of the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences
 - 4. Ivan V. DANILIN**
Head of the Department of Science and Innovation, and Innovation Policy Sector, Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences
 - 5. Denis A. DEGTEREV**
Head of the Department of Theory and History of International Relations, RUDN University; Editor-in-Chief, RUDN Vestnik; Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University–Higher School of Economics
 - 6. Andrei I. DENISOV**
First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy
 - 7. Alexei Yu. DROBININ**
Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy
 - 8. Sergei A. KARAGANOV**
Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Academic Supervisor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Situational Analysis Moderator
 - 9. Vasily B. KASHIN**
Director, Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy
 - 10. Maria S. KHODYNSKAYA-GOLENISHCHEVA**
Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy
 - 11. Yekaterina V. KOLDUNOVA**
Director of the ASEAN Center, MGIMO University, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
 - 12. Alexander M. KRAMARENKO**
Director, Institute of Actual International Problems, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy
 - 13. Alexei V. KUZNETSOV**
Director of the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences; Correspondent Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

14. Anastasia B. LIKHACHEVA

Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

15. Fyodor A. LUKYANOV

Research Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Editor–in–Chief, Russia in Global Affairs; Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

16. Andrei A. MASLOV

Director of the Center for African Studies, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

17. Dmitry M. ROZENTAL

Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

18. Andrei Yu. RUDENKO

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

19. Sergei A. RYABKOV

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

20. Viktor V. SUMSKY

Leading Expert, ASEAN Center, MGIMO University, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

21. Dmitry V. SUSLOV

Deputy Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

22. Prokhor Yu. TEBIN

Head of the Sector of International Military–Political and Military–Economic Problems, Center for Economic Expertise, Institute for Public Administration and Governance, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

23. Dmitry V. TRENIN

Research Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University–Higher School of Economics; Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

24. Pavel V. SHLYKOV

Associate Professor, Department of the History of the Middle and Near East, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University

Academic and Administrative Support

1. Daniil B. MAKUKHIN

Research Assistant, Center for Economic Expertise, Institute for Public Administration and Governance, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

2. Egor N. RYZHKIN

Research Assistant, Center for Economic Expertise, Institute for Public Administration and Governance, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

3. Dmitry A. TSYVAREV

Assistant to Academic Supervisor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

4. Alexandra D. YANKOVA

Research Assistant, Center for Economic Expertise, Institute for Public Administration and Governance, National Research University–Higher School of Economics

Notes

[illegible]

Notes

Notes

[illegible]

Notes

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

